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FOSTERING COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: 
A FAÇADE OF TAIWAN’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
LAWRENCE S. LIU** 
PRELUDE—A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR ECONOMIC REFORM 
In mid-1984, Premier Yu Kuo-hua of the Republic of China (ROC) on 
Taiwan was upset. However, he had no reason to be. President Chiang 
Ching-kuo had just promoted him from the Governor of Taiwan’s Central 
Bank of China (CBC) to become Premier. A thoughtful but low profile 
conservative, he formerly was a trusted lieutenant of the Chiang Kai-shek 
family, whose inner circle ran the ROC government through the 
Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist Party) then. In his more than ten years 
at the helm, he turned the CBC into one of the most powerful agencies in 
Taiwan using foreign exchange control measures authorized under the 
Statute for Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).1  
President Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, hand picked the 
reserved Premier Yu to serve as Premier in part for his conservatism. 
Nonetheless, he soon announced an ambitious message in his first policy 
address in 1984. Henceforth, his economic policy would focus on the three 
pillars of “internationalization, liberalization, and institutionalization” 
(ILI). As this Article will discuss, the ILI policy would guide Taiwan’s 
economic development in the decades to come. Difficult as it was to 
implement, the ILI policy had profound ramifications on the development 
of competition law and policy in Taiwan.  
What upset Premier Yu was that Taiwan was in the middle of one of 
the worst economic crises in its history when he stepped into his new job. 
A few months before, the Tenth Credit Cooperative (TCC) had 
experienced massive runs by depositors concerned with unrecoverable bad 
  This Article is based on a paper delivered at a workshop organized by the University of 
Victoria, University of Washington, Washington University in St. Louis, Chuo University, and the 
Mitsubishi Foundation in Tokyo, July 2001. 
 ** Partner, Lee and Li, concurrently Professor of Law, Soochow University Graduate School of 
Law and National Taiwan University Graduate School of Management, Taipei, Taiwan; J.D., 
University of Chicago; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., National Taiwan University. 
 1. Due to the scarcity of foreign exchange, Taiwan has used foreign exchange controls to 
allocate resources and prioritize economic development programs since the 1950s. These controls also 
serve an important political purpose: perceived safety. It therefore is fitting that the foreign exchange 
statute’s acronym is SAFE.  
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loans to affiliated companies to fund ill-conceived construction and other 
projects. A bailout organized through government-owned banks proved 
insufficient. The public severely criticized the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
for knowingly failing to react to the documented and chronic 
transgressions of the TCC. Part of the powerful and lucrative Cathay 
Insurance Group and controlled by the indigenous Tsai clan, the TCC 
operated as a maverick in the staid government-controlled financial 
community, possessing no qualms about skirting the limits of banking 
regulation.  
In the end, the TCC led to the resignation of Minister Li-Teh Hsu of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) and Minister Rong-Kang Loh 
of the MOF. Accounts suggested that Hsu, previously the finance minister, 
stepped down to shoulder the blame for Premier Yu, who should have 
made the painful decision to sanction the TCC much earlier. 
The TCC incident led to financial and economic crises. Despite the 
superficial Martial Law, public opinion demanded accountability. In 
response, Premier Yu convened an Economic Reform Committee (ERC). 
Composed of senior government officials, scholars, and industry 
representatives, the ERC aimed to build a consensus to implement the ILI 
policy in order to strengthen Taiwan’s economy and prevent the 
recurrence of scandals like that involving the TCC. Serious plenary and 
subgroup meetings of the ERC drew national attention for months and 
produced tomes of proceedings and recommendations. One of the 
recommendations advocated expeditious passage of the Fair Trade Law 
(FTL) bill in order to introduce antitrust laws and rules against unfair 
competition. Scholars had drafted this bill at the request of the MOEA, 
which was experiencing surmounting pressure from Taiwan’s trading 
partners to balance trade, including the adoption of more effective 
mechanisms to prevent unfair competition and combat counterfeiting 
activities. However, the sense at the time was that the FTL was just 
another scholarly exercise funded by a government agency to fully utilize 
its previously allocated budget. 
At the end of the ERC deliberations, however, the cabinet (known as 
the Executive Yuan, or EY) decided to do virtually nothing in 1985. Many 
suggested later that Premier Yu was too conservative to launch any major 
economic reforms, and that he possessed little real decision-making 
authority because the Soviet-trained, populist, and enigmatic President 
Chiang Ching-kuo made all the important decisions. The Yu 
administration’s failure to act cost Taiwan dearly: Taiwan lost a golden 
opportunity to open its economy and reform her economic structure. As 
this Article will show, this reform would have eased the introduction of 
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definitive competition laws.  
In late 1985, Chiang decided to turn his attention away from economic 
policy in order to embrace political reform. As a result, in 1986, the 
increasingly vocal anti-KMT forces formed the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) to institutionalize political opposition. In mid-1987, Chiang 
lifted the Martial Law decree and most of the foreign exchange measures 
under SAFE except controls over short-term capital movement. Several 
months before his death in January 1988, Chiang witnessed the precocious 
and noisy democratization sentiments and public and parliamentary 
protests (including fist fights!) that came to characterize Taiwan’s 
“peaceful revolution” towards democracy in the 1990s. Taiwan would 
never be the same.  
With political reform came the gradual and haphazard opening of 
regulated markets in the 1990s. In 1990, Taiwan formally applied to 
accede to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and later 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), as the independent customs 
territory of Taiwan and offshore islands. With this bid Taiwan began a 
long process of bilateral trade consultations to give concessions, including 
market access, for entry into the most important international agency in 
which statehood was not a requirement. In 1991, Taiwan enacted the FTL 
without much serious deliberation. In the frenzy for full political 
participation, what politician in his or her right mind would oppose 
legislation billed as being “fair”? The FTL authorized a grace period of 
one year, during which the Organic Statute for the Fair Trade Commission 
was enacted. Taiwan established its Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) in 
1992. Thus began Taiwan’s first decade of formally fostering competition 
law and policy. 
This Article examines Taiwan’s experiment with competition law and 
policy throughout the first ten years of the FTL. I argue that the pressure 
of globalization fostered general sentiments in favor of competition policy. 
The FTL reinforced those sentiments, but its first ten years also 
demonstrate a checkered history of enforcement, which the state of the 
political economy in Taiwan greatly affected.  
To illustrate that the first ten years of the FTL represent a façade of 
Taiwan’s political economy, Part I begins with a review of the general 
principles and policy context of the FTL. This part discusses Taiwan’s 
economic development insofar as it relates to the resistance and ultimate 
emergence of competition legislation like the FTL. It also reviews the 
traditional Chinese view of market regulation and some rudimentary forms 
of competition law contained in the Tang Code, as well as the small 
economy phenomenon in Taiwan and the challenges it presents to 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 77 Liu book pages .doc  10/14/02   4:25 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
80    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:77 
 
 
 
 
 
transplanting competition rules like the FTL. This is set against the 
background of the FTL’s legislative goals. 
A critical review of the TFTC and its work follows, and I review the 
political constraints on the commission and the commissioners in a rapidly 
democratizing society like Taiwan. Through the definition of enterprises, I 
then review the state action doctrine that emerged from early TFTC 
decisions and interpretations. I also show the challenges brought by state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in enforcing competition rules. Discussion of 
the regulated industry exemption from the FTL follows, as well as the 
TFTC’s moderately successful competition advocacy program that flows 
from this exemption. At the end of this section, I introduce the intellectual 
property exemption in the FTL, and the tautology it demonstrates.  
Part II then examines monopoly control. It begins with an introduction 
to the definition of monopolies and rules against monopolization in the 
FTL, and then traces the comparative law sources of these rules. 
Representative cases follow, which illustrate the dangers of taking a light-
handed approach to SOEs as well as taking a heavy-handed enforcement 
approach towards foreign firms. Next, I explore merger control in Taiwan 
by examining statistics to show the regulatory cost of merger control in 
Taiwan and describing the few cases in which the TFTC rejected the 
combination applications. I then describe a major policy study in 2001 
leading to an amendment to the FTL in 2002 reforming merger control law 
in Taiwan, with some emphasis on cross-border combinations that are 
related to Taiwan. 
Part III reviews horizontal restraints, vertical restraints, and unfair 
competition. It begins by explaining how the cartel prohibition rule works 
in Taiwan, including a description of what types of cartels can be 
approved and how. I then focus on the TFTC’s staff study, which alludes 
to the empirical results of anti-cartel enforcement and areas where such 
enforcement is becoming more difficult. Next I review price-related and 
non-price vertical restraints and discriminatory treatment under the FTL, 
as well as the doctrinal issues arising from the way these FTL rules work. 
A description of unfair competition follows, as the FTL provides a strange 
continuum from antitrust rules to unfair competition in the same chapter. 
A salient but increasingly troubling feature of this chapter is a catchall rule 
against deceptive and unconscionable conduct, which is a transplant from 
Section 5 of the American Federation Trade Commission Act.2 I go on to 
show why this transplant has not worked well in the context of different 
 2. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994). 
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FTL enforcement mechanisms.  
Part IV examines enforcement mechanisms under the FTL. It 
introduces civil liabilities, criminal sanctions, and administrative 
enforcement sequentially. I then demonstrate the features of these different 
enforcement mechanisms, with a view to comparing the advantages and 
constraints of each enforcement mode. Clearly, after its first decade, the 
FTL has become a form of administrative law. This phenomenon has 
important ramifications on the TFTC as an institution, and it affects the 
case load and case selection, enforcement position, and ultimate 
effectiveness of the FTL. 
Part V shifts the focus somewhat by examining competition policy as 
opposed to competition law per se. The focus of this section is to illustrate 
how competition policy can help to change the market structure in Taiwan. 
I use telecommunications reform as an example of how to foster 
competition policy in Taiwan by recounting the different phases of 
Taiwan’s telecom reform in an expanded political and economic context. I 
also look beyond the opening of the telecommunications market and delve 
somewhat into the challenges of the media convergence in Taiwan and its 
impact on competition law and policy.  
Part VI goes on to review the interactions of the telecommunications 
laws and competition law rules like the FTL. It advocates the importance 
of embracing competition principles and agency coordination. It also 
suggests rethinking FTL rules in the context of a newly deregulated 
market where there clearly is not a level playing field. This illustrates the 
need to rethink industry regulation; in the case of telecommunications, 
leap-frogging technology rapidly makes old regulatory rules obsolete. This 
part ends with a call for independence, which will be important for the 
proposed Telecommunications, Information and Broadcasting 
Commission in Taiwan.  
Part VII concludes by offering a brief summary of the performance of 
competition law and policy in Taiwan. I commend the TFTC on laying a 
good foundation for public awareness of the FTL and developing case law 
in important areas of competition law enforcement. However, I also point 
out the deficiencies of both the FTL and the TFTC. By pointing out the 
risks of misdirecting the enforcement approach for the FTL, I show the 
challenges lying ahead for the TFTC and offer some suggestions for 
improvement. Finally, I stress the importance of faithfully implementing 
competition policy to change market structure, which makes conduct 
regulation under the FTL much easier. In sum, I argue that Taiwan’s first 
decade of enforcing competition law has produced relatively good results, 
compared with experiences elsewhere. I also caution that globalization 
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forces more challenges on a small economy like Taiwan, and that it needs 
to embrace competition and market-opening in all forms to remain 
competitive. 
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICY CONTEXT 
A. Economic Development, the Traditional View and the Small Economy 
Phenomenon 
Until its presidential election in May 2000 and the economic slowdown 
during the subsequent transitional period, some billed Taiwan as a success, 
or even a miracle, in achieving rapid economic development in a short 
span of time without suffering a disproportionate distribution of income 
and wealth.3 Much like Korea, Taiwan has had an industrial policy that 
stresses close government-industry consultation (including “moral 
suasion”), promotion of growth and exports, and forcing firms to be 
globally competitive. Both countries have long-term planning goals and 
develop general, broad guidelines on specific industries to build for the 
future (such as automobiles in Korea and computers in Taiwan).  
In the earlier part of its development history, Taiwan suppressed 
domestic competition. However, its smaller domestic market remains 
significantly more open than Korea’s, and Taiwan’s industrial policy has 
not been as dirigiste and interventionist. By the 1980s, Taiwan began a 
serious program to liberalize trade in goods; by the 1990s, it began to open 
its service industry. However, Taiwan relies more on public enterprises 
than Korea. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s private sector is clearly at the center 
stage of its economy.4 Like other similarly situated economies, Taiwan 
continually explores ways to upgrade its industries, technologies, and 
investment environment, aspiring to become a base for regional 
operations. However, there is one major and interesting distinction: 
Taiwan is integrating rapidly with mainland China, but strong animosity 
across the Taiwan Strait and much uncertainty regarding political 
rapprochement still exist.  
Much of Taiwan’s economic reform revolves around the issues of 
efficiency, fairness (or equality), and the tradeoff between the two. These 
 3. See generally KUO-TING LI, THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY BEHIND TAIWAN’S DEVELOPMENT 
SUCCESS (2d ed. 1995). 
 4. See U.S. Cong. Office of Tech. Assessment, Competing Economies: America, Europe, and 
the Pacific Rim, OTA-ITE-498, at 296 (1991). 
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issues also are at the center of competition laws,5 although traditional 
society never explicitly employed competition policies to achieve a proper 
balance of the two goals. Moreover, as the saying goes in imperial China, 
“fear not insufficiency, but be concerned with inequality.” Traditionally, 
fairness has been more important than efficiency considerations.6 On the 
other hand, at the beginning of his idealist campaign to modernize China 
during the first quarter of the twentieth century, Dr. Sun Yat-sen—
accepted as the Founding Father by both the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and the ROC—hoped to create a fair and affluent society based on 
moderate socialism.  
The traditional political and economic ideals in a particular culture 
inform its view of the role of competition laws. Although foreign 
competition laws significantly influenced the FTL, competition policy is 
not a foreign import to traditional China. Before the First Emperor unified 
China, scholars such as Guan Chung already had warned the Prince of the 
threat posed to the throne, farmers, and small businessmen by merchants 
owning thousands of gold bullion.7 The Tang Dynasty saw the first 
codification of some form of competition policy: the criminal prohibition 
against cornering the market. Article 33 of the miscellaneous provisions of 
the Tang Code, enacted in 737 A.D., prohibited any person selling or 
buying goods from forcibly creating a barrier of entry into the 
marketplace, fixing the prices of goods they would buy or sell, or 
misrepresenting the prices of such goods. A violation could lead to eighty 
floggings and mandatory disgorgement of the offender’s illegal profits.8 
The imperial Chinese distrust of traders, who ranked behind the 
intellectuals, farmers and laborers, not only precedes Adam Smith’s9 but it 
 5. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 40-54 (1985) 
(stating that antitrust laws are not free from politics and ideologies). 
 6. Imperial China did not distinguish between static, allocative, and dynamic efficiencies. 
 7. See Guan Chung, Guan Tze, in THE LEGALISTS’ THOUGHTS ON ECONOMIC REGULATION 
BEFORE THE CHING DYNASTY 50 (Chia-Chu Hou ed., 1985). 
 8. YEN-HUEI DAI, A COMMENTARY ON THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE TANG CODE 266-67, 
cited in D1 WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION § 1.01 n.2 (Julian O. von Kalinowski ed., 1987). 
 9. Adam Smith argued:  
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is 
impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would 
be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade 
from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much 
less to render them necessary. 
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 143 (R.H. 
Campbell et al. eds., 1981), cited in Russell Pittman, Some Critical Provisions in the Antimonopoly 
Laws of Central and Eastern Europe, 26 INT’L LAW. 485, 487 n.4 (1992). 
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also culminated in price controls and state regulation or ownership of 
economic resources and production, thereby stifling capitalist tendencies.10 
According to findings collected by Mancur Olson, government efforts 
proved unsuccessful; toward the end of the Qing Dynasty (i.e., at the turn 
of the twentieth century), some Chinese guilds relentlessly enforced price 
fixing and output restrictions. For example, 123 fellow guild members 
reportedly bit a recalcitrant craftsman to death!11 
Another salient aspect of Taiwan’s economy is that it is a relatively 
small economy that depends heavily upon international trade. Therefore, 
one important issue for Taiwan is whether it needs competition laws at all. 
For example, Taiwan could have adopted a strong competition policy early 
on, such as an open trade policy and the elimination of all entry barriers to 
the service sector.12 If so, Taiwan would have possessed an industrial 
structure that would have made it extremely difficult for any firm to 
engage in anticompetitive conduct over the long term. In such a case, 
Taiwan might not need a competition law, let alone multipurpose 
legislation like the FTL.  
Economic literature is replete with discussions of the optimal 
competition policy for small market economies.13 Taiwan’s smaller size 
and its export dependence would make transplanting competition laws 
from large jurisdictions like the United States, Germany, European Union, 
and Japan problematic. This would be the case despite the “learning 
externalities” of transplanting competition law from these larger 
jurisdictions. Such learning externalities include “a ready basis for the law 
and a large body of comprehensive case law and commentary.”14 Taiwan’s 
smaller size would create particular issues in merger and monopoly 
control policy, and practical difficulties in gauging market dominance 
through often-used market share ratios or other rules of thumb.15 As the 
 10. Teh-kang Tang, Antitrust Began with the Regulation of Iron, MING BAO YUE KAN [MING 
PAO MONTHLY], Aug. 1991, at 5. 
 11. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, 
AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 148-50 (1982). 
 12. This policy is essentially what Hong Kong and Singapore practiced, except that both 
possessed strong domestic service sector competition. Both Hong Kong and Singapore, of course, 
possess even smaller economies than Taiwan. 
 13. See generally Michal S. Gal, Market Conditions Under The Magnifying Glass: General 
Prescriptions for Optimal Competition Policy For Small Market Economies (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & 
Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-01-004, 2001), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/clb/01-004.pdf.  
 14. Id. at 65. 
 15. According to Gal,  
Small size affects the policy towards mergers by placing much more emphasis on efficiency 
considerations and less reliance on structural variables alone. It affects the optimal policy in 
monopolistic markets by requiring less reliance on market forces to erode market power and 
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text below will show, these kinds of issues typify those challenging the 
TFTC in the first decade following enactment of the FTL. 
B. Legislative History and Fundamental Goals of the FTL 
It is always important to ponder why and how a society adopted a 
particular legal rule. In the case of the FTL, the driving force was 
globalization, as indicated by Premier Yu’s ILI initiative back in the mid-
1980s. Reactionary forces, however, led to the enactment of the FTL. As I 
will show later in this Article, they affected the fundamental goals of this 
important legislation. 
The last decade of the twentieth century became more competitive. The 
evidence is clear: the ongoing transformation of the former socialist 
countries into market economies is unleashing market forces previously 
considered to be anathemas. Multilateral and regional trade negotiations, 
such as the WTO and the formation of the North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA), have impacted global trade tremendously. Replacing the 
Cold War ideological confrontations are a sense of pragmatism and a 
preoccupation with economic development. Financial innovation and 
deregulation facilitate the integration of national economies into the global 
economic community. Technological advances shrink the domain of 
natural monopolies, even forcing the convergence of several industries—
such as telephony, communications, computing, publishing, and 
entertainment—into one.16 
Market opening quite often finds its companion in the passage or 
amendment of competition statutes to safeguard competition. Competition 
policies and laws are gaining practice and prominence in, for example, 
both former Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries.17 Improvement of the 
Japanese Antimonopoly Law and its enforcement was an important topic 
of the United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) trade 
negotiations in the early 1990s.18 Despite changes in its administration, 
by placing more emphasis on direct regulation by competition authorities. It also necessitates 
a stricter and a more strongly enforced competition policy towards oligopolies. In addition, 
small size affects the accuracy of many of the rules-of-thumb and indicators of market 
dominance and anti-competitive conduct used in large economies. 
Id. at 66. 
 16. See generally PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (2d ed. 1999 
& Supp. 2002). 
 17. See, e.g., Pittman, supra note 9, at 485-503; Michael Reynolds, Antitrust Comes to Eastern 
Europe, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1991, at 11, 12. 
 18. See, e.g., Kozo Yamamura, Introduction, in JAPAN’S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT 
CHANGE? 2-3 (Kozo Yamamura ed., 1990); John O. Haley, Weak Law, Strong Competition, and Trade 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 77 Liu book pages .doc  10/14/02   4:25 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
86    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:77 
 
 
 
 
 
which affect the focus of antitrust enforcement, the United States always 
has pursued a vigorous enforcement program.19 American trade 
negotiators also have sought to use competition laws to pry open Japan’s 
domestic market.20 In addition, significant evidence exists of the 
proliferation of competition laws elsewhere.21 Taiwan’s enactment of the 
FTL was part of this strong and persistent global trend that began in the 
early 1990s. For example, after the parliamentary election in the United 
Kingdom in mid-2001, the Labour Party government showed a renewed 
interest and developed a definitive program to enforce competition law 
more vigorously.22 
The legislative history of the FTL clearly suggests a strong emphasis 
on efficiency. According to the official statement of the MOEA in 
explaining the FTL bill, the FTL should protect competition, not 
competitors, and certainly not inefficient competitors.23 This is a literal 
copy of statements made by the U. S. Supreme Court in its opinion in 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. (regarding antitrust injury).24 
However, after the lifting of the Martial Law decree in mid-1987, Taiwan 
soon became preoccupied with fairness-related issues. The titling of the 
bill as a fair trade law also shadows the original intent of the MOEA. 
However, this is not a unique phenomenon. Similar laws in Japan, Korea, 
and China always have possessed a fairness or propriety label! 
Barriers: Competitiveness as a Disincentive to Foreign Entry into Japanese Markets, in JAPAN’S 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT CHANGE?, supra, at 203-36. 
 19. Interview: Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice, ANTITRUST, Fall 1993, at 8 (quoting Ms. Bingaman as stating, “In the 
international area, we hope to continue what Jim [Rill, her predecessor in the Bush administration] 
started by urging other countries to enforce their own laws more vigorously.”). 
 20. See Mark K. Morita, Structural Impediments Initiative: Is It An Effective Correction of 
Japan’s Antimonopoly Policy?, 12 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 777 (1991). 
 21. For example, competition laws were recently either adopted or amended in Ireland, Belgium, 
Russia, and Greece. See, e.g., Tony O’Connor, Irish Competition Act, 1991, 12 EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION L. REV. Supp. 6:1-16 (1991); Belgium: Protection of Economic Competition Act 1991, 
13 EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REV. Supp. 3:1-8 (1992); EEA Competition Law, 14 EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION L. REV. Supp. 1:1-28 (1993); The Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR): 
Law on Competition and the Restriction of Monopolies in the Commodity Markets, 14 EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION L. REV. Supp. 2:1-8 (1993); The Greek Act on the Control of Monopolies and 
Oligopolies and on the Protection of Free Competition, 14 EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REV. Supp. 
5:1-12 (1993). 
 22. For a firsthand description of the Labour Party’s plan, see Gordon Brown, New Labour: 
Making Europe More Productive, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 20, 2001, at 6, available at 2001 WL-
WSJA 22051383. One feature of this proposal includes criminal punishment of cartel activities. 
 23. See Minister Ta-hai Lee’s remarks in introducing the FTL to Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan for 
the bill’s first reading by the Judiciary and Economic Affairs committees on June 26, 1986. See 
LEGISLATIVE YUAN, 75 OFFICIAL GAZETTE, Issue 1978, at 2-3 (Sept. 20, 1986). 
 24. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
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There are two salient features in the FTL: antitrust law and unfair 
competition law. Taiwan’s trading partners (particularly the United States) 
demanded for years that Taiwan expeditiously adopt unfair competition 
laws in order to enhance its anti-counterfeiting enforcement program. 
Taiwan had experienced piracy in the domestic market since the 1960s. 
However, by the late 1970s, counterfeiters in Taiwan already occupied a 
rather competitive position to export knockoffs. Interestingly, 
globalization and Taiwan’s success to meet the challenge of piracy 
actually made counterfeiting a bigger problem for Taiwan. Therefore, the 
American trade negotiators were keen to halt a new but increasingly 
rampant trend in its incipiency. Nonetheless, these negotiators were 
indifferent regarding enactment of antitrust rules in Taiwan. Such antitrust 
rules actually may have concerned them out of a fear the rules would 
become anti-trade regulatory measures! However, conflicting sentiments 
already existed in Taiwan in the early 1980s: some academics zealously 
supported the transplant of German-style competition legislation. Indeed, 
the FTL draft was the result of an MOEA-commissioned academic study 
by the German-worshiping Law Faculty of National Taiwan University.  
These two forces, namely, the appeasement of trading partners and 
aspirations to transplant competition law as an elegant and egalitarian 
institution, resulted in making the FTL a bundled product: love unfair 
competition rules, love antitrust laws! From a comparative law 
perspective, the integration of antitrust rules and unfair competition rules 
within the same statute is highly unusual. Despite their purported 
efficiency-enhancing goals, one easily can confuse the antitrust rules in the 
FTL as enforced by the TFTC (particularly those involving large-firm 
conduct and vertical restraints) with fair competition principles. One 
example concerns the treatment of vertical restraints and the licensing of 
exclusionary practices in Chapter III of the FTL, which addresses unfair 
competition issues like passing off and false advertising.25 
Academic politics also affected the FTL’s antitrust rules, which form 
the core of competition law in Taiwan. Since the Nationalist government’s 
adoption of Roman Civil Law through Germanic codes in the 1930s in 
mainland China, the Civil Law influence has prevailed in postwar Taiwan. 
Taiwanese legal scholars studied mostly in Germany. The rigor and logic 
of codified German competition law made it the model of European 
competition law. Therefore, it seemed natural for Taiwan to follow the 
 25. See Kung Píng Jiau Yih Fa [Fair Trade Law] arts. 18, 19 (1991) (amended 2000), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov.tw [hereinafter FTL]. 
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Germanic rather than the American model of competition law. In addition, 
with its common law approach and disarray of inaccessible, difficult-to-
digest, and often conflicting court decisions, how could any country 
effectively transplant American antitrust law? 
In contrast to academic lawyers, Taiwanese economists received most 
of their training or influence from the United States. Economic studies 
focus primarily on functions and results, and care much less about the 
forms and styles of borrowed legal rules. Worse still was the fact that 
Taiwanese economists approached antitrust issues through the lens of 
American textbooks on industrial organization, and were much more 
familiar with American antitrust case law than German-style competition 
code. Taiwanese economists also were bitter over their exclusion from the 
FTL drafting process. They argued that academic lawyers could not 
understand antitrust economics, a point clearly evidenced by the fact that 
the law professor from National Taiwan University who drafted the first 
FTL bill confused the output of domestic manufacturers with their market 
share in a much publicized so-called empirical study during the ERC 
debates! 
Taiwan has a practice of stating the legislative goals of a regulatory law 
in its first provision, presumably to offer guidance and minimize future 
interpretive confusion. Korea’s Fair Trade Law and Japan’s Antimonopoly 
Law follow the same practice, whereas the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act 
and the German Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbschrānkungen (GWB) and 
Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) do not contain such 
specific clauses.26 However, even when one can find the legislative goals 
in secondary sources such as legislative materials, competition laws’ 
policy contents serve as fertile ground for contentions that could last more 
than a century.27 “Buzz words” in the FTL probably will not fare any 
differently. 
The FTL sets forth as its primary purposes the development of a market 
economy, maintenance of fair competition, and protection of consumer 
welfare,28 but its legislative purposes clause fails to mention the protection 
of the lawful interest of business operators. However, Article 1 of the FTL 
 26. See Hoil Yoon, Regulation of International Contracts under the New Fair Trade Law, E. 
ASIAN EXEC. REP., Nov. 1980, at 18-20; Sang-Hyun Song, Experimenting with Antitrust Law, E. 
ASIAN EXEC. REP., July 1981, at 3, 14-18; The Act Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopoly 
and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No. 54 of 1947, reprinted in HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, 
THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN app. A, at 387 (1994). 
 27. See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED 
YEARS (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991). 
 28. FTL art. 1. 
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implies such protection by stressing economic stability and prosperity. The 
choice of words in the FTL, including “enhancing the stability and 
prosperity of the economy,” appears to be more neutral. The FTL 
nevertheless contains vague legislative goals in Article 1, including 
“maintaining orderly conditions for trade.”29 
Economists do not discuss how orderly the market behaves, and terms 
such as “orderly marketing agreements” connote protectionism under 
international trade laws. However, Friedrich A. Hayek provides a lucid 
and convincing explanation of market order: it must be a “spontaneous 
order representing an equilibrium set up from within, rather than a made 
order.”30 This illustration should be instructive in interpreting the antitrust 
provisions of the FTL; the government should allow market forces to work 
without artificial, distortive arrangements, regardless of whether the 
government or conspiring traders create them. Insofar as an act of unfair 
competition wrongfully exploits the commercial goodwill of another 
enterprise or releases inaccurate information into the market, Hayek’s 
spontaneity test also could explain well the order-maintenance purpose of 
Taiwan’s competition laws. 
The first several years of FTL enforcement generated an emerging 
body of decisions by the TFTC interpreting its purposes and all 
contemplated conduct. Some such interpretations are mutually 
inconsistent. They highlight tensions within the TFTC, which has groped 
for the proper legislative goals of the FTL since day one. For example, the 
TFTC cited both the avoidance of congestion in the harbor and inland 
transportation and the compatibility with domestic economic, trade, and 
agricultural policies as reasons for approving a joint importation of grains 
by competitors.31 It also used the welfare of employees of agricultural 
cooperatives in Taiwan, the need for leisure, and social customs to justify 
upholding the uniform day of market closure.32  
The TFTC held that government subsidies proposed by the 
Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) to offer to water supply 
 29. Id. 
 30. See 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 36-42 (1973). 
 31. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Approval No. 81-Kung-Lien-001, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, July 1992, at 14 (stating that thirty-six members of Taiwan’s trade association for flour-
related firms and their affiliates approved the joint importation of wheat until the end of 1994, 
provided that following June 1, 1993, no restrictions on the eligibility of joint importers could exist). 
The TFTC published two volumes of selected cases, guidelines, and interpretations in English. See 
Fair Trade Comm’n, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE FAIR TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
Vol. 1 (1999) and Vol. 2 (2000). 
 32. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-011, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, July 1992, at 23. 
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companies, which are public utilities, to produce better bottled drinking 
water for sale at a price close to cost violated the FTL. The TFTC 
recognized the need for a purer water supply, but remained concerned with 
the unfair advantage subsidized firms might obtain in the marketplace.33 
However, in an earlier TFTC interpretation requested by the association of 
private hospitals, the TFTC stated that the government could provide 
budgeted funds to public hospitals for policy reasons. Such conduct, it 
asserted, would not constitute a violation of the FTL because an agency 
performing an official government function was responsible for the 
conduct, rather than an enterprise engaging in profit-seeking activities.34 
The TFTC approved the merger of two affiliated shipping lines 
primarily because, in addition to increased efficiencies, the merger would 
enhance the competitiveness of Taiwan’s shipping companies relative to 
foreign lines, a seemingly mercantilist policy.35 In another merger of 
affiliates of a Dutch bank with a branch office in Taiwan, the TFTC stated 
in its approval that this restructuring would enhance Taiwan’s position as a 
regional financial center, which was a similar (albeit somewhat wishful) 
policy manifestation.36 Another merger control case involved one foreign 
bank’s takeover of the assets and business of the branch of another foreign 
bank, which withdrew from Taiwan because a third foreign bank, which 
already had a branch in the relevant market in Taiwan, acquired it. The 
TFTC held that maintaining the employment of the existing staff 
constituted one of the reasons for such an approval.37 
These decisions and interpretations do not necessarily present a 
coherent inner logic, evidencing that the TFTC still is groping for the 
purposes of the FTL in actual cases. They indicate both paternalistic and 
free market tendencies; the language of some decisions suggests industrial 
policy concerns, while other decisions suggest moralistic undertones. The 
TFTC enforcement decisions against foreign cosmetics firms whose 
distribution and pricing practices were challenged in mid-1992 present one 
 33. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-029, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Aug. 1992, at 44. 
 34. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-001, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, June 1992, at 4. 
 35. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Approval No. 81-Kung-Yi-01924, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Sept. 1992, at 20; Fair Trade Comm’n, Approval No. 81-Kung-Chieh-001, 1 GAZETTE OF 
THE FAIR TRADE COMM’N, Sept. 1992, at 20. 
 36. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Approval No. 82-Kung-Chieh-5000, 2 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR 
TRADE COMM’N, Jan. 1993, at 33-34. 
 37. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Approval No. 81-Kung-Yi-08104, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Sept. 1992, at 22; Fair Trade Comm’n, Approval No. 81-Kung-Chieh-002, 1 GAZETTE OF 
THE FAIR TRADE COMM’N, Sept. 1992, at 22. 
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example. These TFTC decisions took the position that firms should 
compete on the merits of the product and should not create an image of 
prestige by maintaining high retail prices. In the decisions, the TFTC also 
advised big department stores distributing cosmetics products to remain 
mindful of their corporate image because of their substantial capital base!  
Obviously, these decisions suggest an explicit TFTC concern with the 
high prices of status/luxury goods.38 There may be an implicit concern 
with cross-border price discrimination by multinational firms as well, as 
imported cosmetics products command prices much higher in Taiwan than 
they do in Europe or North America, the substantial appreciation of the 
New Taiwan dollar at the time notwithstanding. On the whole, however, 
these TFTC decisions illustrate a preference for allowing more room for 
market forces, signifying Taiwan’s trend toward a more open market 
economy. 
C. The TFTC and Its Work 
The FTL was one of the few bills drafted before but enacted after 
President Chiang lifted Taiwan’s Martial Law decree. This legislative 
history has one important implication. As is common with pre-1990 
legislation, the FTL grants tremendous discretion to the TFTC as the trade 
regulator. The TFTC was to become a department of the MOEA, thereby 
following the German approach (that is, the federal cartel office, or 
Bundeskartellamt). Therefore, competition law enforcement would be 
subject to bureaucratic controls. Post-Martial Law developments led to the 
elevation of the TFTC to become a purportedly self-governing 
commission, but it has struggled ever since to fulfill this expectation of 
independence. 
Pursuant to the FTL and the Organic Statute for the Fair Trade 
Commission, the TFTC shall consist of nine commissioners, including one 
as chairman and one as vice chairman. All commissioners must be 
nonpartisan, and they must possess certain professional qualifications in 
fields such as law, economics, accounting, and public administration.39 
Even so, there is room for flexible interpretation of such mandatory 
 38. See, e.g., 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE COMM’N, Aug. 1992, at 10, 12, 16, 20, 24. On 
status goods, see THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899). 
 39. See Organic Statute of the Fair Trade Comm’n arts. 1, 11, 12, 13 (Jan. 13, 1992). Although 
the TFTC chairman may not participate in political activities, soon after he was inducted in early 2000, 
the third-term chairman took to the streets to join anti-nuclear power advocates in Taiwan, despite a 
reminder from the Premier that he not participate in such demonstrations. He received strong criticism 
and subsequently pledged never to do it again.  
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professional credentials so that political appointments do occur. 
Commissioners often possess impressive credentials. For example, all of 
the first-term TFTC commissioners but one possess a doctoral degree. 
Commissioners serve three-year terms, and multiple terms are possible. 
More importantly, the same political party may only represent less than a 
majority of the commissioners. One therefore can argue that, other than 
the Central Elections Commission created under the Elections and Recall 
Law, the TFTC is perhaps the only true commission-style agency in 
Taiwan. Other government commissions, such as the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) and Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC), operate more like the traditional agencies headed by a 
single responsible official. Commissioners of the CEPD and SFC 
essentially serve as ex officio representatives of other agencies. 
Despite its institutional arrangements and protections against 
domination by political parties, the TFTC failed to achieve sufficient 
independence and professionalism during its first decade. To begin with, 
under Taiwan’s Constitution it is virtually impossible to create a truly 
independent commission. This is principally because all agencies exist 
under the EY, the supreme executive agency under the Constitution. 
Indeed, the full title of the TFTC shows that it is a part of the EY! 
Therefore, as a member of Taiwan’s cabinet, the chairman of the TFTC is 
susceptible to political pressure in the enforcement of the FTL. The 
enforcement campaign against high prices of foreign-imported cosmetics 
products in the early 1990s provides an example. This campaign closely 
followed a cabinet meeting in which the Premier complained about 
inflation pressure and high-priced imports.40 
To be sure, the TFTC should operate like a commission. However, the 
chairman still can assert influence over the TFTC that is stronger than any 
regular member. In the first two terms of the TFTC, the chairman 
informally invited most commissioners to serve before the President ever 
approved the formal recommendation of nominated commissioners, 
including the chairman himself. For the appointment of the third-term 
TFTC commissioners, the DPP-controlled EY became even more assertive 
in proposing candidates.41 In addition, the TFTC chairman’s influence 
 40. This mirrors what General Hau Pei-tsun did as Premier. Cosmetics happened to be one 
product that relied on pricing and other strategies to maintain a high end image. However, what 
Thorstein Veblen recognized as status goods did not fare well with the TFTC. See supra note 38 and 
accompanying text. 
 41. After relocating from mainland China in 1949, the KMT ruled Taiwan until the presidential 
election of March 2000. 
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reaches other areas such as case assignment, coordination with other 
agencies, and the mood of full-commission deliberations. The traditional 
Chinese bureaucratic culture also solidifies personal control by the titular 
head of an agency originally set up to have collective leadership and 
decision-making authority. This type of personal leadership by the TFTC 
chairmanship is particularly strong when he or she comes from the 
administration. The TFTC staff originally came from the Price 
Surveillance Council of the MOEA, where this kind of personal leadership 
was not unusual. 
There is one healthy aspect of the commissioners’ conduct. Even 
though no public record of this fact exists, all anecdotal evidence suggests 
that commissioners have become more argumentative over time. During 
the first two terms, the TFTC rarely resorted to actual voting among 
commissioners. Much like a panel of appellate judges, commissioners 
would compromise to reach a common position for more difficult cases. 
However, they developed a practice from the very first term of the TFTC 
to keep internal records of dissents. Starting in 2000, the TFTC began to 
publish dissenting opinions of the commissioners in the TFTC Gazette. 
Over time, this practice would make the TFTC more semi-judicial in 
behavior and therefore more accountable.42 
Another reason for the phenomenon of a strong chairmanship is that 
despite the professional and political requirements for becoming a 
commissioner a limited supply of potential commissioners exists. They 
come from either the bureaucracy or academia, as political concerns 
preclude recruiting commissioners from the business community. 
Universities loan academics on a term of leave of absence, which usually 
is for three or four years.43 Unfortunately, Taiwan enacted the FTL when 
campus politics began in earnest and Taiwan began to embrace 
democratization. University professors did not wish to allow their 
colleagues to enjoy the limelight and perceived power at the TFTC with an 
extended leave of absence! Therefore, universities extend such a three- or 
four-year leave of absence only once in a while.  
 42. First-term TFTC commissioners, who argued that they should be able to write dissenting 
opinions, must receive credit. A compromise led to internal recordation of dissents. The source of 
inspiration for this practice came from Taiwan’s Council of Grand Justices, which publishes dissenting 
opinions. In Taiwan, regular courts do not publish dissenting opinions. On this judicial practice, see 
Lawrence Shao-liang Liu, Judicial Review and Emerging Constitutionalism: The Uneasy Case for the 
Republic of China on Taiwan, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 509 (1991). 
 43. A TFTC commissioner possesses stature equivalent to that of a political appointee 
(analogous to a vice minister), which means that individuals who have not passed the civil service test 
for tenured civil servants may still qualify. 
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While commissioners with academic backgrounds are intellectually 
thoughtful and may bring expertise, they suffer from the usual problems of 
Taiwanese academics: a lack of real world experience and administrative 
skills. Their short leaves of absence also make it difficult to maintain 
continuity, unless a commissioner decides to permanently leave academia 
for the TFTC. Commissioners (other than the chairman and vice chairman, 
who have administrative responsibilities) receive assignments to supervise 
cases by random choice. In actuality, the staff is really in charge of 
moving the cases along and analyzing the issues. These factors combine to 
disconnect the link between the permanent TFTC staff and the temporary 
commissioners. In the first decade of the TFTC, this phenomenon created 
unavoidable confusion and delays.  
In the first three terms of the TFTC, no chairman has ever been an 
expert in competition law or antitrust economics. This is unfortunate 
because a real expert could have launched a new agency like the TFTC 
with the necessary verve and technical capabilities. However, like other 
economic laws in a Chinese society, Taiwan enacted the FTL before a 
societal consensus for its need or psychological acceptance of it existed 
within Taiwan’s bureaucracy. The first TFTC chairman, a first-rate 
professor of marketing and a savvy politician, focused on public 
awareness rather than enforcing the law as his foremost enforcement goal. 
This wise strategy dampened industry concerns and opposition because 
initially there was more smoke than fire. In addition, it significantly 
enhanced public awareness. However, this background caused unusual 
results to ensue: it weakened FTL enforcement. Because publicity 
generated many complaints from alleged victims, the TFTC has had a 
heavy workload. However, as the following case law analysis 
demonstrates, the work overload has caused the quality of its work to 
suffer.  
Compared with the courts, the TFTC monopolizes FTL enforcement. 
Unlike the United States, the FTL is not and never will become judge-
made common law. Very few FTL cases even exist, and none of them 
constitute meaningful precedent. Judges in Taiwan are professionally-
trained law graduates who typically start their career young and without 
much practical experience (let alone business experience or exposure to 
the commercial practice of law). Virtually none of them show interest in 
the rigorous economic analysis that pervades antitrust law. Indeed, 
economics never has occupied a significant role in the curriculum of 
Taiwan’s law schools, which remain part of the undergraduate college 
education. In 1999, Taiwan amended the FTL to require deferral of all 
criminal prosecutions arising under the FTL until the TFTC first has 
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assessed administrative fines. In light of the above, the FTL now operates 
as a kind of administrative law. Unless the administrative nature of FTL 
enforcement changes, it will have a long-term adverse impact on the 
development of antitrust jurisprudence in Taiwan. 
The TFTC also has tried advocating competition policy within the EY, 
albeit with limited success. Primary regulators believe they should 
regulate and protect certain industry members. The fact that the TFTC 
sometimes fails to take a position based purely on competition policy 
grounds compromises its role as a champion for competition policy within 
the government. However, Taiwan’s recent assession to the WTO (and the 
subsequent opening up of the economy) will make the TFTC’s 
competition advocacy work much easier. 
As previously mentioned, the TFTC carries a very heavy workload.44 
Since the mid-1990s, its annual intake has ranged from two thousand and 
twenty-five hundred cases involving petitions, complaints, and requests 
for interpretations. This amount does not include investigations initiated 
by the TFTC itself, interagency coordination on competition advocacy, 
and other activities, and is substantial for an agency of less than three 
hundred individuals. One reason for the TFTC’s heavy workload is that it 
handles many cases that should be regular civil and commercial litigation 
cases. However, many complainants saw the advantage of using TFTC 
enforcement to gain leverage over an opposing party. For example, the 
bulk of FTL cases involve false advertising arising under Article 21 of the 
FTL.45 Another important aspect of these enforcement statistics is that 
even though the TFTC initiated a significant number of investigation 
cases, it did not vigorously pursue them. The large amount of general 
unfair trade practice cases arising under Article 24 of the FTL reflects 
this.46 In addition, combination approvals (that is, merger review cases) 
constituted a large portion of the TFTC’s caseload.47 This is deceptive 
because the FTL’s low threshold actually captures many franchise 
participation cases, which should not concern antitrust authorities! 
One indicia of the TFTC’s monopolization of FTL enforcement is the 
plethora of rules and guidelines it developed throughout the first decade of 
the FTL. The FTL itself only authorized a few rules like the Implementing 
Rules and Rules Governing Multilevel Distributions and Sales. However, 
because of the KMT’s perceived concerns of a robust FTL enforcement 
 44. See Table 1, infra, at 161. 
 45. See Table 2, infra, at 161. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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program, the TFTC began developing various guidelines to “guide” 
industry conduct through moral suasion. Moreover, after a few years work 
in a particular field, the TFTC accumulated some decisions, 
interpretations, and position statements on specific issues. The TFTC then 
combined these “hard” and “soft” laws into guidelines. Foreign practices, 
such as various U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
guidelines also influenced the FTL. That many commissioners came from 
academia helped: academics could embrace such abstract principles more 
readily. Finally, as the TFTC expanded, it developed a need for certain 
procedural rules to achieve internal procedural coherence. The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), enacted in mid-1999 and entering 
into force in 2001, contained similar procedural requirements for 
predictability and transparency. 
The following represent the major rules and guidelines promulgated by 
the TFTC. They include a set of guidelines on what types of joint 
construction bids would not be subject to the FTL. The TFTC adopted 
these guidelines before Taiwan enacted the Government Procure Law 
(GPL) as part of the WTO negotiations. The TFTC therefore intervened 
because enough commissioners during the TFTC’s first term thought this 
field was fraught with corruption, bid rigging, unfair competition, 
favoritism, and irregularities. However, some guidance would be 
necessary in the case of joint bids, which could be pro-competitive. 
Therefore, the TFTC intended these guidelines to fill the gap and provide a 
level playing field. After passage of the GPL, the TFTC then terminated 
these guidelines. 
The TFTC also adopted a set of guidelines governing how the FTL 
would affect the private law conduct of government agencies. There are 
two ways for public agencies in Taiwan to get involved with private 
economic activities. First, they could operate as a state-owned operating 
business unit, like the old Directorate General of Telecommunications 
(DGT) before the passage of the telecommunications reform legislation. 
Second, they could purchase goods and services. In both cases, the TFTC 
has asserted its jurisdiction, and these guidelines sought to offer more 
predictability. 
The work of trade associations often strengthens cartel activities. 
Therefore, the FTL defines enterprises to include trade associations.48 The 
TFTC also adopted a set of guidelines interpreting what trade association 
conduct the FTL would reach. 
 48. FTL art. 2(3). 
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In the area of merger control, the TFTC developed a set of criteria for 
determining the minimum sales amount that would trigger merger control. 
It also adopted a set of regulations governing fast-track merger review. As 
the discussion below will show, most merger control cases in Taiwan 
actually involve franchise participation cases. In response, the TFTC 
adopted a set of guidelines governing information disclosure by franchise 
owners. In addition, the TFTC also developed an important set of 
guidelines governing cross-border merger control in 2000. 
In the area of cartel control, the TFTC adopted guidelines on the 
review of joint pricing decisions by small and medium size businesses 
pursuant to the SME exemption, elaborated upon below. The TFTC also 
adopted a set of deadlines pursuant to APA requirements that will apply to 
its review of applications for concerted actions. 
In the areas of vertical restraints and unfair competition, the TFTC has 
formulated numerous guidelines. For example, it adopted a set of 
guidelines to review factors governing the determination of “threats of 
unfair competition,” mentioned in several clauses of FTL Article 19.49 To 
implement the Article 19(3) imperative against improper enticement of 
competitors’ customers using illegal means, the TFTC adopted a set of 
guidelines on the limits and extent to which merchants may resort to 
offering gifts and prizes to attract customers. The TFTC also adopted a set 
of guidelines in late 1990s governing the exercise of intellectual property 
rights, including the issuance of warning letters asserting patent, 
trademark, and copyright infringement. Similarly, in 2001, the TFTC 
adopted a set of guidelines governing antitrust review of technology 
licensing programs. Another set of guidelines defines what constitutes 
illegal shelf space fees demanded by convenience store chains from brand 
merchants. When the importance of cable television programming became 
obvious and the industry began both vertical and horizontal consolidation, 
the TFTC adopted a set of guidelines governing the transparency of 
program licensing activities by program providers. 
Other similar guidelines governing unfair competition include those 
addressing passing off, false advertising or misleading commercial 
symbols, and the pre-sale of housing units and related advertising 
programs. The TFTC took guidelines governing what constitutes deceptive 
and other unconscionable conduct to define the general principle against 
unfair and deceptive practices in Article 24 of the FTL. To demonstrate 
 49. See, e.g., FTL art. 19(3) (“No enterprise shall . . . [cause] the trading counterpart(s) of its 
competitors to do business . . . by coercion, inducement with interest, or other improper means . . .”). 
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the meticulousness of the TFTC, it even drafted a set of guidelines to 
govern its review of “illegal family and household outsourcing contract 
work” for factories. 
Several guidelines are more procedural in nature. In addition to the 
cartel-approval deadlines, the TFTC adopted guidelines governing 
“administrative guidance,” which addresses how it will apply moral 
suasion to the private sector. Indeed, this kind of regulatory conduct could 
stand competition law on its head. However, for a society like Taiwan 
with little exposure to formal competition law, moral suasion remains 
important and necessary. The APA even contains a general authorization 
for such a regulatory practice. In addition, the TFTC adopted guidelines 
governing cross-border cases.  
Two recent procedural guidelines are noteworthy. The first relates to 
the conduct of oral argument as part of the TFTC review. The second 
relates to the conduct of formal public hearings, which is particularly 
important for the future because the TFTC jealously has sought to protect 
its “independence” since its formation. As the EY polices the TFTC and 
its decisions, the TFTC runs the risk of the private sector challenging its 
decisions before the EY under the APA. The TFTC is increasingly 
uncomfortable with any other agency in the executive branch of the 
government challenging its decisions and therefore is beginning to resort 
to the APA public hearings procedure. According to the APA, an agency 
adjudication following a formal public hearing obviates an administrative 
appeal. One can only challenge the decision in court pursuant to the 
Administrative Litigation Law (ALL). 
Even though the TFTC is a young and somewhat inexperienced 
antitrust regulatory agency, it is very energetic in the area of international 
outreach, including its practice of holding international symposia 
approximately every three years, at which internationally renowned 
scholars and leaders of fellow antitrust agencies give lectures.50 The TFTC 
maintains a working relationship with the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) through the OECD’s dialogue 
program with dynamic economies. Most importantly, as a part of the Asia-
Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC) initiative mentioned herein, 
the TFTC received the EY’s support and funding for proposing the current 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Competition Policy Database 
 50. The author had the pleasure of organizing the first international symposium of the TFTC 
entitled the Symposium on the International Harmonization of Competition Law and Policy. The 
proceedings have been reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF COMPETITION LAWS (Chih-
kang Wang et al. eds., 1995). 
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to the APEC forum. This database has the potential to be one of the 
strongest collections of competition law and policy in the Pacific Rim and 
the APEC region. 
The TFTC’s international outreach is not without reason. First and 
foremost, Taiwan suffered greatly from PRC-imposed diplomatic 
isolation. Taiwan therefore cannot participate in international 
organizations requiring statehood and political sovereignty. However, 
along with globalization came the necessity for all sorts of fora and 
dialogue on economic policy. Second, the heavy academic representation 
of the commissioners provided the TFTC with a contingent with excellent 
international training and exposure. Third, the TFTC clearly is thinking 
about what role its enforcement experience could play in much of Asia 
where fostering competition law and policy is an emerging enterprise.  
D. Enterprises and State Actions  
The FTL primarily regulates the conduct of “enterprises” in the 
market.51 The TFTC continually develops case law on what constitutes an 
enterprise. For economic agents engaging in profit-seeking activities in the 
private sector, the more difficult question is the status of certain self-
employed professionals and other individuals providing goods and 
services. The TFTC’s interpretations seem to suggest that, as these 
individuals are laborers without a definite employer, they are not 
independent and therefore are not enterprises.52 As a result, the TFTC 
declined to comment on the legality of price control arrangements or other 
means of restricting competition among such “laborers.” One could find 
fault with these legalistic interpretations, as these individuals clearly 
operate as self-employed, free-lance “firms” as understood in the 
traditional economic sense. The FTL’s definition of what constitutes an 
enterprise sweeps broadly enough to encompass them.  
Taiwan is a mixed economy with state intervention. Accordingly, an 
important issue under ROC laws is whether and to what extent the FTL 
would apply to acts of government agencies and instrumentalities. For 
 51. Article 2 of the FTL defines enterprises to include companies, sole proprietorships, 
partnerships, trade associations, and other persons or organizations engaged in transactions through the 
sale of goods or provision of services. See FTL art. 2(3). 
 52. See, e.g., Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-028, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR 
TRADE COMM’N, Aug. 1992, at 43 (stating that members of the association of bookkeepers are not 
enterprises for tax purposes); Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-059, 2 GAZETTE OF 
THE FAIR TRADE COMM’N, July 1993, at 366 (stating that members of the association of sales 
promotion personnel are not enterprises).  
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certain, the definitions of “enterprises” and “business operators” capture 
SOEs, which are legal persons. However, it is more difficult to determine 
where to draw the line with government agencies, which engage in official 
acts. 
Interpretations and decisions of the TFTC point to an emerging test in 
Taiwan: whether the agency engages in conduct considered to be a market 
transaction, or whether it performs a government function. For example, 
the review of payment standards by the Employment Insurance Bureau is a 
public act because the agency was conducting government functions in a 
program created under a mandatory provision of the Statute for 
Employment Insurance.53 The TFTC’s interpretation relating to 
government funding of public hospitals’ budgets also indicates a public 
and official act of the government not subject to the FTL, though this fails 
to square with another TFTC interpretation treating subsidies for purer 
water supplies as illegal. 
In yet another interpretation, the TFTC held that the Press of the 
Provincial Government of Taiwan (PPGT) was not an enterprise, as it was 
not an independent entity. In addition, the Provincial Government of 
Taiwan’s (PGT) decree to subordinate agencies and provincial, county, 
and city schools that they would contract out printing for official 
documents and books to the PPGT was an official act of the government 
designed to conserve the budget and ensure confidentiality. As such, the 
FTL failed to extend to this conduct.54 However, assuming that the official 
conduct doctrine is acceptable, its application in this situation is 
questionable. The FTL’s definition of enterprises contemplates “groups,” 
which essentially are unincorporated entities with a representative. The 
PPGT clearly engages in the sale of goods, as book printing is a well-
recognized market industry. The need to maintain confidentiality for 
printing, say, textbooks also presents a puzzling justification. The implicit 
justification that the PPGT would be cheaper than all commercial presses 
in Taiwan lacks an empirical foundation, and it defies the trend towards 
privatization in Taiwan. 
The TFTC followed the same approach in another interpretation 
rendered just a few months later. The PGT engaged Taiwan Bookstore 
(TB), a PGT-affiliated enterprise, to print and supply textbooks for four 
courses taught in all elementary schools as a way to implement national 
 53. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-055, 2 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, May 1993, at 53. 
 54. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-034, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Sept. 1992, at 31. 
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education. The TFTC opined that such conduct and TB’s contract with 
commercial presses to delegate the printing and sale of such books both 
constituted official conduct, which falls outside the scope of the FTL. 
However, TB’s distribution and sale of other textbooks was ultra vires and 
therefore could not constitute official conduct. To that extent, the FTL 
would reach TB’s conduct.55 Granted that national education is a policy 
implemented pursuant to the ROC Constitution, why should it necessarily 
follow that a state-owned bookstore could monopolize the provision of 
textbooks for certain courses? 
In a similar interpretation, the Students’ Group Insurance Program for 
the Province of Taiwan, which the PGT-affiliated Taiwan Life Insurance 
Company manages, received a challenge. The TFTC followed the same 
official conduct doctrine and opined that this program for students of 
public schools was a “mandatory social insurance” program of the PGT. 
The PGT-affiliated insurance company only served as an agent entrusted 
to administer the program.56 One could perceive, for example, deposit 
insurance as a form of social insurance to reduce the systemic risks of runs 
on financial institutions. However, why would group insurance for 
students of some public schools necessarily constitute a form of social 
insurance? Like the PPGT interpretation, this interpretation fails to square 
with the logic of the official conduct doctrine. 
The TFTC’s later enforcement policy has focused on applying the FTL 
to government agencies as purchasers (instead of purveyors) of goods and 
services. This type of cases, such as writing specifications so as to favor a 
private vendor of goods or services, often arises in the context of opening 
tender offers. The enforcement policy nevertheless operates somewhat 
strangely, as fellow government agencies are rarely at the receiving end of 
enforcement activities by authorities administering competition laws. One 
would think that Taiwan’s laws governing the ethics of civil servants 
would be a more applicable enforcement tool. They are, but the general 
perception of laxity in enforcement persists. Such enforcement under the 
FTL therefore reflects frustrations with the futility of codes of ethics and 
suggests an activist distrust of some agency behavior. 
When the FTL was drafted in the 1980s, Taiwan was just beginning to 
open its economy. As a result, the FTL contained a provision in Article 
 55. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-041, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Dec. 1992, at 53. 
 56. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-038, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Sept. 1992, at 35. 
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46(2) that exempted the conduct of SOEs for four years.57 The drafters 
originally intended this short-term escape clause to provide an opportunity 
for the SOEs to make adjustments. From the beginning, however, the 
TFTC (which lacked the power to grant such exemptions) took a 
conservative approach to applications for such exemptions. The TFTC 
clearly enjoyed the general support of public opinion, which always has 
displayed grassroots resentment of the phenomenon of “permitting 
officials to set fires, but denying citizens the right to even light lanterns” in 
traditional Chinese culture. Pressure from consumers, media, and the 
private sector made it difficult for SOEs to obtain any meaningful 
exemptions.  
Timing also was an important factor. The FTL was drafted when 
Taiwan still operated under the Martial Law decree. However, by the time 
of enactment, Taiwan already was a precocious democracy. The Article 
46(2) exemption became an empty promise to SOEs and, ultimately, the 
1999 amendment to the FTL repealed it. SOEs, however, were not subject 
to the rigorous enforcement of the FTL during the first decade of 
enforcement. The government simply could not break away from the 
previous policy (and social contract) and prosecute SOEs, which often 
carry social responsibilities. In other words, a weak exemption indeed 
constituted a useless shield. However, the TFTC also could not find the 
political will to turn other FTL provisions into a sword against SOEs. As 
the third term of the TFTC drew to a close, however, signs began to 
emerge of a new approach toward SOEs and private companies with 
substantial market power. 
E. The Regulated Industry Exemption 
Another exemption under Article 46 of the FTL essentially applies to 
regulated industries. This FTL provision permits a conduct-specific (and, 
to such an extent, essentially permanent) exemption when an enterprise 
engages in conduct “in accordance with law.”58 For example, fixing the 
commission rate for securities brokerage transactions pursuant to the 
Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) was held exempt under this 
provision.59 Similarly, financial institutions’ fixing of penalty rates for an 
 57. Former Article 46(2) provided an exemption for conduct by such companies, public utilities, 
and transportation enterprises if they obtained approval from the EY. FTL art. 46(2) (repealed 1999). 
 58. FTL art. 46 (“Where there is any other law governing the conduct of enterprises . . . such 
other law shall govern; provided that it does not conflict with the purposes of this Law.”). 
 59. See Press Release, Fair Trade Comm’n, Taipei, Taiwan (Mar. 28, 1992). 
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early termination of time deposits in accordance with MOF regulations 
adopted pursuant to the Banking Law also was exempt.60 In addition, local 
monopolies for gas utilities and their price formulation in accordance with 
the Statute for the Supervision of Privately-Owned Public Utilities 
constituted an exempt conduct.61 Likewise, the Customs Law authorized 
MOF regulations governing the provision of customs clearance services. 
As a result, although the TFTC could invoke the Article 9 interagency 
coordination mechanism, it could not challenge these regulations as 
violations of the FTL.62 
However, certain inconsistencies existed. For example, joint decisions 
made by members of the trade association of container transportation 
enterprises to increase freight without first obtaining the definitive 
approval of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) 
would not fall within the exemption of Article 46, even if the trade 
association reported the increase to the MOTC.63 Where an administrative 
agency issued a decree impacting the market based on its general 
regulatory power to oversee the activities of regulated firms and not on the 
basis of a specific provision of the regulatory legislation, the FTL would 
not exempt the conduct. However, the TFTC was unclear as to whether 
collective conduct in reliance upon such unauthorized administrative 
guidance, or moral suasion, constituted an illegal cartel.64 
For certain, exemptions for public utilities and transportation 
enterprises under the repealed 46(2) exemption overlap with the current 
Article 46 exemption. Regardless of their sophistication or propriety, 
different competition policies are formulated under the FTL to deal with 
the intricate interface of antitrust, regulation, and state ownership. The 
FTL thus allows some leeway for different economic principles governing 
these areas.65 The TFTC has advocated opening the markets for Taiwan’s 
 60. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-049, 2 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Jan. 1993, at 41. As part of Taiwan’s interest rate deregulation, the Banking Law ultimately 
was amended to prevent banks from fixing interest rates. 
 61. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-010, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, July 1992, at 22. 
 62. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Administration of Customs Clearance Service & Trade-Van 
Information Service Co., Ltd., 1 CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE FAIR TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 41 (1999). 
 63. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 82-Kung-Chu-057, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Dec. 1992, at 21. 
 64. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-052, 2 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Mar. 1993, at 54. 
 65. For a classical theory of regulation and its critique, see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND 
ITS REFORM 13-35 (1982). 
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regulated industries in order to introduce more competition.66 During the 
second term of the TFTC, the EY began an economic reform program 
called the APROC initiative. It involved an aspirational, voluntary 
program to remove entry and operating barriers, which would allow 
Taiwan to maximize its comparative advantages and seek a more 
prominent regional role. In other words, the APROC initiative was a 
revival of the ILI initiative of the mid-1980s.  
One of the goals of the APROC initiative was to rely more on 
competition policy and less on industrial policy.67 The TFTC quickly 
seized this opportunity to develop a program it called the “Article 46(2) 
Special Project.” The TFTC intended the special project to survey all laws 
and regulations that led to the displacement of market forces by 
government regulation. Under the auspices of this special project, the 
TFTC pursued a dialogue with other agencies that were the primary 
regulators of various industries. However, the TFTC ultimately failed to 
persuade other ministries to drop their anticompetitive industry 
regulations. Other agencies would take the position that they were 
coequals with the TFTC. In fact, in the 1999 amendment to Article 46, the 
Legislative Yuan (LY) strengthened the hands of the TFTC. The 
amendment requires that industry regulation follow the “spirit” of the 
FTL. In other words, the LY intended this amendment to transform the 
FTL into an economic Magna Carta. However, the amendment turned out 
to offer only lip service. As the 1999 amendment was not part of the 
original amendment bill sponsored by the TFTC, it did not invoke this new 
economic power itself. In sum, despite its failure, the TFTC’s competition 
advocacy effort further reinforced the deregulatory and market-opening 
measures of other agencies. 
F. An Exemption Based on Intellectual Property Rights 
The FTL also contains an exemption for the “proper exercise” of 
intellectual property rights such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights.68 
This measure should be recharacterized as a “rule of reason” approach to 
licensing and other antitrust issues relating to intellectual property. In 
 66. See Interview with Chih-kang Wang: Even with Punches on the Nose, Promotion of Fair 
Trade Is a Must, UNITED DAILY NEWS, Jan. 2, 1994, at 19. 
 67. See Lawrence S. Liu, Aspiring to Excel—The Uneasy Case of Implementing Taiwan’s Asia-
Pacific Regional Operations Center Plan, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 199 (1996). The author served as 
the chief architect of this policy in favor of competition policy, and served as the first Director General 
in charge of the APROC initiative. 
 68. FTL art. 45. It is notable that Article 45 does not specifically mention know-how. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/7
p 77 Liu book pages .doc  10/14/02   4:25 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] FOSTERING COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 105 
 
 
 
 
 
other words, this provision does not contemplate a true exemption, which 
would presuppose a certain level of improper conduct. As Taiwan 
continues to liberalize its domestic market, integrate with other economies 
in the region, and develop more mature, higher value-added technologies, 
the antitrust implications of licensing activities become more important. 
By the mid-1990s, the TFTC developed guidelines governing, for 
example, how owners of technologies such as patents could send out 
warning letters. Failure to comply with these guidelines when sending out 
warning letters would constitute an improper exercise of their intellectual 
property rights, and subsequently the intellectual property exemption 
would not apply. 
Somewhat similar to the old Article 46(2) exemption for SOEs, the 
intellectual property exemption was not much of a shield. By the end of its 
third term, the TFTC even began using the FTL as a sword against 
intellectual property licensing programs. The outgoing third term adopted 
guidelines governing licensing activities in early 2001. On the same day, it 
handed down a decision challenging the joint CD-R patent licensing 
program of Philips, Sony, and Taiyo Yuden, three global leaders holding 
advanced CD-R and DVD technology. The TFTC accepted most of the 
allegations made by Taiwanese licensees, which occupied about 70% of 
the global market for the manufacture of CD-Rs. 
II. MONOPOLY CONTROL 
A. Finding Monopolies and Oligopolies 
The central goal of antitrust rules is to control monopolistic behavior. 
Taiwan’s FTL sets forth an elaborate framework for finding monopolies 
and punishing monopoly conduct. Patterned after the German and 
European Union models of competition law, it covers both monopolies 
and oligopolies.69 Ostensible reasons for controlling oligopolies are that 
the government perceives many sectors of Taiwan’s economy to be highly 
concentrated and proving collusive conduct could be very difficult.70 The 
mandatory publishing and updating of a list of monopolistic enterprises by 
 69. See FTL art. 5. A monopoly exists when an enterprise either does not face competition in the 
relevant market (which contemplates both the product and geographical markets), or occupies such a 
dominant market position that it excludes competition. Several enterprises that collectively constitute a 
monopolistic market structure and fail to engage in price competition could be deemed monopolistic or 
oligopolistic. 
 70. See Lawrence S. Liu, In the Name of Fair Trade: A Commentary on the New Competition 
Law and Policy of Taiwan, The Republic of China, 27 INT’L LAW. 145, 149 (1993). 
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the TFTC, based on this government fear of highly concentrated sectors, is 
a measure borrowed from the Korean Fair Trade Law. The task of 
gathering basic industry information began even when the FTL was still 
pending in Taiwan’s LY, and in February 1992, the TFTC published a list 
of forty monopolies covering thirty-three relevant markets.71  
The Implementing Rules provide for qualitative and quantitative tests 
to assist in the determination of the relevant market and the existence of 
monopolies.72 Certain factors must be taken into account, and certain 
specific numeric rules of thumb exist. All in all, however, the approach is 
generally structural; like Article 22 of the German GWB, the finding of 
certain market shares, regardless of industry, presumptively could lead to a 
finding of a single-firm monopoly, duopoly, or three-firm oligopoly. In 
February 2002, these tests were elevated from the Implementing Rules and 
placed directly into the FTL through an amendment. This amendment has 
made the FTL more rigid in determining whether market power exists. 
Under the FTL as amended in 2002, a monopoly or oligopoly does not 
exist unless it meets an aggregate market share test. In addition, either an 
individual market share test or an individual revenue test must be satisfied. 
In the case of a single firm, an enterprise controlling a 50% share in the 
relevant market could constitute a monopoly. Two enterprises jointly 
possessing a two-thirds market share could constitute a duopoly. Three 
enterprises collectively commanding a 75% share in a market could 
constitute a three-firm oligopoly. However, each such enterprise also 
should have at least a 10% share in the relevant market, or more than 
NT$1 billion (less than US$40 million) in revenues for the fiscal year 
preceding the determination.  
Where special circumstances exist, enterprises could constitute 
monopolies or oligopolies even though they do not meet these general 
tests. Such circumstances include entry barriers to the provision of goods 
or services created by law (such as government licensing regulations) or 
technology, and other factors that enable existing enterprises to influence 
the supply and demand in the relevant market and exclude competition.73 
The TFTC subjects qualifying monopolies to a more rigorous antitrust 
scrutiny. They may not (1) engage in unfair exclusion to block other 
competitors, (2) make improper decisions on the prices of their goods or 
 71. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Public Notice No. 82-Kung-Fa-Mi-002, 2 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR 
TRADE COMM’N, Feb. 1993, at 1. 
 72. See Implementing Rules to the Fair Trade Law of 1999 arts. 3-5, available at http://www.ftc. 
gov.tw [hereinafter Implementing Rules]. 
 73. FTL arts. 4-5. 
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services (or improperly maintain such prices), (3) provide discriminatory 
treatment to counterparties with just cause, or (4) otherwise abuse their 
dominant market positions.74 
The requirement of publishing and updating a list of monopolies in the 
abstract under rigid quantitative tests and before any public or private 
enforcement action is taken proved to be costly, marginally useful, 
problematic, and lacking support in economic theories. First, this exercise 
essentially used Taiwan as the relevant geographical market. Yet, 
Taiwan’s export promotion policy and its status as an increasingly open 
island economy undercut the persuasiveness of this approach. Many 
Taiwanese firms compete largely on a global basis. Enforcement 
authorities need not delimit the boundary of geographical markets by their 
national borders. The joint venture between General Motors and Toyota to 
manufacture cars in Fremont, California serves as an example.75  
Second, the listing and updating requirement created the incorrect 
impression that Taiwan was full of monopolies. No one disputes that 
Taiwan, like any other economy, may contain monopolies. Most of the 
forty enterprises listed as monopolies or oligopolies were either colonial 
companies inherited from the Japanese occupation from 1895 to 1945 or 
products of Taiwan’s postwar industrial policy. The FTL-mandated list of 
monopolies in no way represents Taiwan’s current economic reality.  
Third, the TFTC applies the relative and absolute quantitative tests 
arbitrarily, without regard to the different nature of various industries. 
Even the structural market share test under the GWB model, from which 
the FTL drew its inspiration, may not withstand rigorous academic 
scrutiny. In addition, despite the enumeration of other factors, the apparent 
dispositive factor is market share, which may have received too much 
weight, especially in light of the crude approach to market definition.  
In the European Union, a similar decision of the European Commission 
is instructive. DMV, the surviving company of a proposed merger between 
the stainless steel tube subsidiaries of Germany’s Mannesmann, France’s 
Vallourec, and Italy’s Ilva would control 36% of the European market. 
With Sweden’s Scandvik already controlling 33% of the stainless steel 
tube market, the proposed merger could create a 70% duopoly. Despite the 
urging of its competition commissioner, Karel Van Miert, and the Merger 
Task Force of Directorate General IV, the European Commission in a tie 
 74. FTL art. 10. 
 75. See John E. Kwoka, Jr., International Joint Venture: General Motors and Toyota, in THE 
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 46-79 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989). 
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vote decided that the merger was legal.76 Query the policy justifications 
for, and wisdom of, a small, open economy such as Taiwan taking a 
position on market structure that is more stringent than the European 
Union! 
Fourth, the FTL requires a finding that firms in a heavily concentrated 
market not engage in actual price competition before being deemed a 
collective monopoly. This exercise apparently was disregarded and, 
surprisingly, the firms contesting their listing did not raise this issue in 
their briefs.77 
Fifth, the FTL’s requirement of periodically listing monopolies 
operated like a mandate to strenuously and regularly aim, but not shoot, at 
a moving target. This wasted a lot of time; at the time when the TFTC 
worked on investigations and research leading to the publication of the 
list, it had to mobilize almost half of its professional staff for months 
exclusively for this task.78 The FTL’s legislative intent was benign: send a 
warning so that only the labeled monopolies need be concerned. However, 
when competitors or consumers filed complaints, or when the TFTC took 
enforcement actions on its own motion, market conditions may have 
changed. This constitutes the principal reason why the FTL was amended 
in 1999 to do away with this requirement of listing monopolies. 
Sixth, even though the list of monopolies may not be completely 
correct, it is still an ironic accusation of Taiwan’s industrial policy from an 
earlier era. Most monopolies turned out to be either state-owned or state-
affiliated enterprises or firms created as a result of government policies 
restricting entry into the relevant segment of the economy.  
B. Rules Against Monopolization and TFTC Case Law 
The rules against monopolization in Article 10 are the centerpiece of 
the FTL. These rules prohibit a monopoly (or a group of oligopolies) from 
directly or indirectly using unfair methods to prevent other enterprises 
from competing. It may not improperly determine, maintain, or change the 
prices of goods or the remuneration for services. In addition, it may not 
 76. See European Competition Policy: Down the Tubes, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 66-67. 
 77. Until such challenges became final, some academic controversy existed as to whether an 
announcement like this constitutes an agency action challengeable under Taiwan laws. However, 
Interpretation No. 156 of Taiwan’s Council of Grand Justices, which allows standing to citizens 
adversely affected by a modified urban plan, suggests its justifiability. 
 78. The author served as an adviser to the Preparatory Office of the Fair Trade Commission, a 
precursor to the TFTC, and saw firsthand the work of the officials who ultimately comprised the TFTC 
staff. 
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cause a counterparty to provide preferential treatment without proper 
reasons. Finally, Article 10 contains a general prohibition against the 
abuse of a dominant market position. In the abstract, these anti-
monopolization rules appear sound and appropriate. However, as the text 
below demonstrates, the challenges lie in the actual enforcement of these 
rules. 
Reflecting a concern with the exclusionary practices of public utilities 
and legal monopolies, the TFTC has invoked the anti-monopolization 
provisions of Taiwan’s FTL to prevent an exclusionary practice by the 
state-owned Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC). A listed monopoly in 
several market segments (including the provision of family-use liquid 
gas), the CPC possessed a general distribution arrangement with the 
Liquid Gas Supply Division (GSD) of the Veterans’ Assistance Council 
(VAC). The VAC is an agency created in the 1950s that owns businesses 
run by veterans as a way to assist their livelihood. The CPC had granted 
GSD exclusive franchises. Following a challenge of this marketing 
arrangement as being illegal under the FTL, the TFTC gave the CPC six 
months to open the distribution franchises.79 
The CPC Liquid Gas case is important in several aspects. First, the 
TFTC took action directed at an SOE. Such enforcement necessarily has 
political significance. The challenged monopoly, in fact, is one of the 
CPC’s less important monopolies, which, for example, monopolized the 
importation and refinery of crude oil until 1999. Second, the FTL’s 
enforcement action followed the moral suasion rather than adversarial 
approach. This essentially resulted in a de facto consent decree. In other 
words, the TFTC adopted a lenient and clearly unfair approach with the 
CPC, perhaps because of its status as a state unit. Third, it remained 
unclear whether the FTL provides any sort of structural remedy. The CPC 
Liquid Gas case came very close to reaching the same result of applying a 
structural remedy, for there was no divestiture or break up of an enterprise, 
but the FTL nonetheless was able to gouge open the vertical restraints in 
the market. 
In another case, the Fu Hwa Securities Finance Company, a TFTC-
listed monopoly controlled by the then-ruling party in Taiwan, the KMT, 
and occupying a strong position in margin lending business, received a 
challenge. The TFTC failed to take enforcement action against Fu Hwa 
because it achieved its monopoly or market dominant status by 
 79. See Chih-kang Wang, The Current Status and Prospect for the Enforcement of the Fair Trade 
Law 15 (Dec. 11, 1993) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Chairman Wang’s Report]. 
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authorization under the SEL and Taiwan’s industrial policy of an earlier 
era.80 Even the SFC does not possess a complete say in whether the 
securities financing market can be liberalized. 
In a way, the Fu Hwa Securities Finance Company case is more 
significant than the CPC Liquid Gas case. After finding that Fu Hwa did 
not violate the FTL, the TFTC nevertheless invoked Article 9 of the FTL 
to argue strongly with the SFC, the MOF, and the CBC for opening the 
markets. Article 9 essentially requires the TFTC to consult other agencies 
that regulate certain industries and businesses when applying the FTL. 
This requirement serves as a useful wedge for the TFTC. It enables the 
enforcement authorities of competition laws to both conduct moral suasion 
with private enterprises and seek voluntary compliance action and 
competition advocacy within the government bureaucracy.  
The FTL’s anti-monopolization provisions in Article 10 obviously 
target the pricing practices of listed monopolies.81 There is reason to 
believe that the TFTC would challenge predatory pricing. In a bid 
challenged by other competitors under a similar provision of the FTL,82 
one of two affiliated biomedical companies won the bid for a contract with 
Taiwan’s Department of Health for hepatitis-B vaccines. It sent in a token 
bid price of NT$0.1, and its sister company bid on the basis of supplying 
the vaccines at no charge. The TFTC held that, once adopted, consumers 
could not substitute the vaccines easily. Therefore, such bidding conduct 
constituted an attempt to corner the market for similar supplies in the 
future through predatory pricing.83  
The Vaccine Bid case suggests that the FTL generally is concerned 
with predatory pricing. A clear inference is that the FTL’s anti-
monopolization provisions also manifest the same concerns. Like 
European competition laws, the text of Article 10 of the FTL reaches 
broadly enough to be concerned with artificially high prices. For example, 
the TFTC’s aforementioned investigations of imported cosmetics products 
echo the same concerns with high prices.  
As another aspect of the FTL’s monopoly control, price and non-price 
discrimination could constitute monopolistic conduct challengeable under 
Article 10 of the FTL. However, unjustifiable discrimination against other 
enterprises and consumers could constitute a violation of either the general 
 80. See id. 
 81. See FTL art. 10. 
 82. The bid was challenged under Article 19(3) of the FTL, which prohibits an enterprise from 
using improper incentives to entice others to engage in business with it. See supra note 49. 
 83. See 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE COMM’N, June 1992, at 1. 
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anti-discrimination rule84 or the catchall rule against unfair competition.85 
The legislative history of Article 10(c) demonstrates a concern with 
“monopsony.” The CPC Jet Fuel I case is the leading case arising under 
the FTL, although the TFTC did not decide it under Article 10(c).86 Before 
the CPC’s listing as a monopoly, the TFTC held that the CPC violated the 
FTL provision generally prohibiting unjustifiable discrimination.87 The 
conduct involved supplying a privately owned domestic airline with jet 
fuel at higher prices than those for both China Airlines, the de facto state-
owned flag carrier, and foreign airlines. 
Much remains unexplored as to the meaning of “abuse of a dominant 
market position” under the FTL’s anti-monopolization rule in Article 
10(d). Article 148 of Taiwan’s Civil Code contains a rule against the 
“abuse of rights” in civil matters. However, the criminal sanctions of 
imprisonment for violating the similarly worded rule in Article 10(d) of 
the FTL create discomfort in Taiwan’s business community, despite the 
argument that the anti-monopolization rule under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, which carries the same imprisonment sanctions, 
does not even define “monopolization.” Similar provisions of the German 
GWB and Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome do not authorize criminal 
sanctions. 
The TFTC appears to be very careful about invoking FTC Article 
10(d), even though a published list of TFTC-mandated monopolies existed 
during the period when former Article 10(2) required such a list. In view 
of its problems and controversies with listing such monopolies, the TFTC 
appears to be extremely careful in its investigation of any case arising 
under Article 10(d), and indeed under any clause of Article 10. Until 2000, 
the TFTC seemed content with resorting to more well-defined provisions 
to challenge anticompetitive conduct. For anticompetitive market 
structures reflecting certain regulatory concerns, the TFTC seemed more 
inclined to rely on its “Article 9 program” of resorting to moral suasion 
with regulated enterprises and competition advocacy with their regulators. 
One example of this moral suasion approach is the Taipei Water 
Department Overdue Bills case. It involved a TFTC request made on the 
Taipei Water Department in 1995 to amend its operating charter to no 
 84. FTL art. 19(2) (“No enterprise shall . . . [treat] another enterprise discriminatively without 
justification . . .”). 
 85. FTL art. 24 (“In addition to what is provided for in this Law, no enterprise shall otherwise 
have any deceptive or obviously unfair conduct that is able to affect trading order.”). 
 86. See 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE COMM’N, Sept. 1992, at 11. 
 87. See supra note 84. 
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longer require new users at the same location to pay the overdue bills of 
old users before they could obtain water.88 Even though this case 
resembles a consumer protection case, and the Taipei Water Department 
was not trying to exclude competition (it was a monopolistic public 
utility), the TFTC invoked Article 10 of the FTL. However, it did not take 
formal enforcement action. Rather, using the Article 9 interagency 
coordination provision, the TFTC asked the Taipei Water Department and 
other water companies, as well as their primary regulators, to remove such 
unreasonable payment requirements from their operating charters. 
Another example of the moral suasion approach is the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Data Transmission case.89 The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) 
is a self-regulatory organization under the SEL. Until the early 1990s, it 
constituted the only centralized securities trading market in Taiwan, and as 
such, a monopoly in its relevant product market. The TSE entered into an 
exclusive data transmission service agreement with Chung Hua Telecom 
(CHT), the state-owned telecom monopoly authorized by the DGT.90 The 
TFTC found that the TSE established minimum capitalization and other 
factors as entry barriers to providing such electronic data transmission 
services. Instead of formally invoking Article 10 of the FTL, however, it 
relied again on Article 9’s interagency coordination provision to ask for 
the revision and removal of this anticompetitive rule. 
In 1996, the DGT itself fell under attack. As the state-owned monopoly 
telecommunications operator, it provided very poor service. Consumers 
complained to the TFTC that the DGT and its subordinate local offices 
failed to properly investigate subscriber complaints about calls that they 
claimed someone else made. In the Telecom Office Billings case, the 
TFTC hinted at invoking Article 10.91 However, again it relied on Article 
9’s interagency coordination provision to ask DGT to improve its billing 
and call verification practice. 
Consumers challenged the Taipei Water Department in the 1996 Taipei 
Water Department Installation Fees case, alleging overcharging for 
installation.92 The Taipei Water Department also prohibited users from 
 88. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Public Utility, 1 CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE FAIR TRADE LAW 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 29-30 (1999). 
 89. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Taiwan Stock Exchange Corp., 1 CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
FAIR TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 30-32 (1999). 
 90. Indeed, as the forthcoming text will show, before the telecommunications reform in 1995-96, 
the CHT was recognized as the business arm of the DGT. 
 91. See Fair Trade Comm’n, The Telecommunication Offices, 1 CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
FAIR TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 32-34 (1999). 
 92. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Taipei Water Department, 1 CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE FAIR 
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outsourcing such installation from other contractors. Therefore, in addition 
to allegations of the abuse of a monopoly position and overcharging for 
installation, there were allegations of exclusionary practices. These 
findings would have supported an Article 10 anti-monopolization case. 
Again, to maintain harmony and allow an adjustment period, the TFTC 
invoked Article 9’s interagency coordination procedure to end this 
anticompetitive activity. 
Trade policy, specifically the high prices for domestically produced 
sugar, fell under attack in the Taiwan Sugar Corp. High Sugar Price case 
of 1996.93 For decades, Taiwan has maintained a high price policy for 
domestic sugar and prohibited the importation of foreign sugar. The state-
owned Taiwan Sugar Corp., which has lost its competitiveness in the core 
farm business but remains one of the largest land owners in Taiwan, 
administers this policy. In this case, food processing companies that were 
major users of sugar complained to the TFTC that high sugar prices and a 
no importation policy added costs to their products. The TFTC found no 
Article 10 violation because (1) Taiwan Sugar Corp. was only following 
government orders, (2) there were many issues regarding the opening up 
of the sugar industry, and (3) the TFTC already had made its competition 
advocacy pitch in inter-government coordination meetings. In other words, 
the TFTC decided to throw up its hands!  
In 1996, two air freight warehousing companies complained to the 
TFTC, which led to its decision in the Airport Express Delivery Center 
case.94 These companies had applied to the Taipei Customs Bureau in 
1995 to establish an express delivery center. However, the Customs 
Bureau turned down their applications because it claimed that they lacked 
enough manpower to regulate these new facilities. Meanwhile, under a 
bilateral air transport agreement between Taiwan and the United States, 
Taiwan agreed to supply express courier transshipment facilities to 
American carriers (such as Federal Express and United Parcel Service) if 
space permitted. Since this is a heavily regulated area and the government 
possessed an APROC policy involving certain usage of airport facilities, 
the TFTC went through an Article 9 coordination without ever taking a 
definitive position on the complaints. 
In 1997, food processing companies challenged the Taiwan Sugar 
TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 35-36 (1999). 
 93. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Taiwan Sugar Corp., 1 CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE FAIR 
TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 37-38 (1999). 
 94. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Yung Ch’u Co., Ltd. & Yuan Hsiang Warehouse Co., Ltd., 1 CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON THE FAIR TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 38-39 (1999). 
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Company in the Taiwan Sugar Corp. Payment Terms case.95 As the name 
suggests, the food processing companies challenged the Taiwan Sugar 
Company over unreasonable payment terms. Their complaints included 
demands made by Taiwan Sugar Corp. for cash payments against purchase 
orders, preventing buyers from personally loading sugar, and requiring 
buyers to furnish transportation to pick up grain sugar. The TFTC found 
that these were not unreasonable terms and were common in other 
industries as well. As a result, it found no Article 10 violation. 
The 1997 Taiwan Stock Exchange Securities Trading Information case 
represents the culmination of the moral suasion approach.96 In this case, 
allegations were made against the TSE for abusing its dominant market 
position by charging for securities trading information based on the 
number of computer terminals that securities firms owned. Allegations 
also were made that this practice would complement the TSE’s revenues, 
hinting at some kind of tying arrangement. The TFTC concluded that the 
SFC had approved the TSE regulations and it therefore could not exercise 
“complete discretion under administrative guidance.” Nevertheless, the 
TFTC sought adjustment of this practice and the TSE caved in by offering 
a wider range of tiered pricing. 
In March 2000, Taiwan’s presidential election led to a DPP President, 
who was inducted in May. For the first time in about fifty years, the KMT 
became an opposition party. This political change coincided with the 
TFTC’s first two anti-monopolization decisions. The first of such 
decisions was the Taipei Metropolitan Gas Company case.97 Based on 
consumer complaints, the TFTC found that the Taipei Metropolitan Gas 
Company regularly had installed a type of gas meter (called the No. 5 
Meter) that would have a higher level (eighteen degrees) of minimum 
usage per month for many household consumers, rather than the No. 3 
Meter, which only had a minimum usage of twelve degrees per month. 
The TFTC also found that compared with other gas utilities, minimum-
usage payments made to the Taipei Metropolitan Gas Company accounted 
for 8.7% of all of its accounts, whereas similar minimum-usage payments 
by other gas companies only represented somewhere between 0.02% and 
1.32% of their total accounts, representing a ratio eight to ten times higher. 
 95. See Fair Trade Comm’n, The Taiwan Sugar Corp., 1 CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE FAIR 
TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 40-41 (1999). 
 96. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Taiwan Stock Exchange Corp., 1 CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
FAIR TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 43-44 (1999). 
 97. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 89-Kung-Chu-083, 9 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, May 2000, at 125. 
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In addition, TFTC investigations also showed that in two sample months 
in 1994 and 1999, the No. 5 Meter represented 69.5% of all meters used 
by the Taipei Metropolitan Gas Company. The TFTC then found the 
Taipei Metropolitan Gas Company to be a monopoly, an easy 
determination due to its status as a statutory public utility. The TFTC also 
found that its conduct violated Article 10(b)’s improper price 
determination test. The TFTC ordered the Taipei Metropolitan Gas 
company to both pay a substantial administrative fine (NT$5 million, or 
about US$170,000) and install within one month No. 3 Meters for 
households that would have met the lower minimum usage level. 
The TFTC rendered its second anti-monopolization decision in the 
CPC Jet Fuel II case.98 As part of the petroleum liberalization plan in 
Taiwan, the government gradually allowed more competition with the 
CPC, the state-owned former monopoly. Wen Chiu Company then began 
providing jet fuel to international carriers at the CKS International Airport 
in March 1997. In July 1997, the government opened up the jet fuel supply 
market for domestic carriers as well. Wen Chiu Company then sought 
quotations from the CPC twice in 1999 for jet fuel supply so that it could 
supply domestic carriers. By January 2000, the CPC advised Wen Chiu 
Company that since all domestic carriers had signed annual jet fuel supply 
agreements with the CPC, it would not supply such fuel to Wen Chiu. 
Wen Chiu Company subsequently complained to the TFTC. 
Other than a value-added tax of 5%, the TFTC found no differentiation 
between jet fuel supply to international carriers and domestic carriers. In 
addition, it found no operational differences in the storage, distribution, 
and supply of jet fuel for these different carriers. The TFTC further found 
that delays in the Civil Aeronautics Administration’s regulations on jet 
fuel supply foreclosed Wen Chiu Company’s opportunity to supply 
domestic carriers with imported jet fuel. In addition, Formosa Plastics 
(CPC’s largest competitor in the petroleum market since 2000) did not 
initiate production of jet fuel until May 2000. Therefore, the TFTC found 
that the CPC’s procrastination, followed by its refusal to deal, constituted 
an open-and-shut case of monopolistic exclusionary practice in violation 
of Article 10(b) of the FTL. The TFTC fined the CPC NT$5 million as 
well. 
In a major decision in early 2001, the outgoing third-term TFTC 
showed its concerns with high prices in a major Article 10 case against 
 98. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 89-Kung-Chu-170, 9 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Oct. 2000, at 62. 
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three leading foreign firms, Philips, Sony, and Taiyo Yuden.99 These 
companies lead the development of technologies for the manufacture of 
CD-R products. They own blocking patents, which are essential to the 
manufacture of CD-R products. As a part of the global licensing 
arrangement, the three firms entered a program delegating Philips as the 
front-line authority to license technologies represented by their patent pool 
to manufacturers. Typically, these joint licensing agreements, including 
those with Taiwan licensees, provide for a running royalty of 3% of net 
sales, or ten Japanese Yen per piece, whichever is higher. 
Over time, Taiwanese licensees became leading manufacturers of CD-
R products worldwide, enjoying more than 70% of the global market. 
Keen competition (and perhaps price wars brought on by Taiwan 
licensees) dramatically reduced CD-R prices over time as well. As a result, 
the Japanese Yen flat royalty rate became a substantial cost for Taiwanese 
licensees’ manufacture of CD-Rs. When they refused to pay this rate and 
demanded price renegotiations, the foreign licensors took recourse with 
civil litigation. As a countermeasure, the licensees filed complaints with 
the TFTC, alleging both illegal cartel-like licensing in violation of FTL 
Article 14 and monopolization in violation of FTL Article 10. After more 
than eighteen months of investigations, the TFTC ruled against the foreign 
licensors and levied a substantial administrative fine. The foreign licensors 
since have desisted from joint licensing activities, paid the fine, and 
challenged the TFTC’s decisions with the EY as part of the administrative 
appeal process. 
Several aspects of the TFTC’s decision against foreign licensors of 
CD-R patents are problematic. First, the TFTC defined the relevant 
product market as the innovation market for CD-Rs, failing to take other 
storage devices and technologies into account. More important, the TFTC 
took the position that a drop in the prices of the licensed products would 
require pricing renegotiations. Otherwise, it would impact the licensees 
unfairly. Specifically, the TFTC cited the “improper price maintenance” 
language of Article 10 and argued that charging high prices would violate 
the rules against monopolization. Among the arguments supporting the 
TFTC’s position is the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances (reflected in 
the Latin doctrine of res sic stantibus) under civil obligations law. 
It is amazing that the TFTC found “high” rather than low prices to be 
monopolistic conduct! Increasing prices invites competition, whereas 
 
 99. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 90-Kung-Chu-021, 10 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Feb. 2001, at 150. The author represents the foreign licensors in their defense and challenge 
of the TFTC decision. 
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reducing prices may smack of predatory pricing. As Lester Telser 
discovered, licensors (or manufacturers owners) of products would not 
overcharge licensees (or distributors) because it would be similar to taxing 
licensees and would lead to a sales shrinkage.100 This, argued Telser, 
would not happen if manufacturers shared the same economic incentives 
as distributors: to maximize sales and profits.101 Therefore, it is in the self-
interest of licensors to ensure that they do not overcharge for their patents. 
In fact, it is clear that the joint licensing of blocking patents would 
maximize wealth and efficiency more than unilateral or sequential 
licensing. Indeed, one of the commissioners since has published a paper 
demonstrating the legality of such a joint licensing program and the 
propriety of the pricing of the royalties ex ante.102 
The CD-R case is important in several aspects. First, the TFTC’s 
enforcement policy—that “high” prices may constitute monopolization—
is dangerous and misguided. Second, the TFTC read the “improper price 
maintenance” language of Article 10 as creating a duty to renegotiate in 
good faith when market conditions change. The context of the CD-R case 
shows that one possible reason for the market change is the price wars 
brought on by Taiwan CD-R manufacturers licensed by the three foreign 
patent owners. In any event, the TFTC has intervened in the terms of 
royalty arrangements. Third, the licensees themselves controlled about 
70% of the global market, and in the FTL’s own terms, this may even 
present a case of “monopsony” (an aspect the TFTC has ignored). Fourth, 
in finding that foreign licensors constituted monopolies, the TFTC adopted 
a narrow approach of product market definition by focusing on the 
technology of CD-R manufacturers, rather than technologies for all similar 
storage devices. Fifth, this case presents a classic “us versus them” 
scenario, as licensors are foreign and licensees are leading Taiwanese 
companies. Therefore, there is a high risk of using the competition law to 
“protect” national champions. This would stand competition law on its 
head! 
While the Taipei Metropolitan Gas Company and CPC Jet Fuel II 
cases are less difficult, their simplicity helped the TFTC (or at least 
enough TFTC commissioners to constitute a clear majority) launch its 
anti-monopolization campaign in the closing days of the FTL’s first 
decade. In fact, the Taipei Metropolitan Gas Company case is more like a 
consumer protection case. The Taipei Metropolitan Gas Company was not 
 100. See Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). 
 101. Id. 
 
 102. Jun-ji Shih, Patent Pools: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (2001). 
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concerned with competition because it had no competitors. The TFTC 
could have relied on the catchall in Article 24 of the FTL, but instead it 
chose to invoke Article 10 to make a point and signal its new anti-
monopolization policy. 
While direct evidence of the TFTC’s higher profile beginning in 2000 
is difficult to identify, the coincidental timing of the political change in 
Taiwan and more aggressive FTL enforcement shows that politics matter. 
It matters if the decentralization of political power allows antitrust 
authorities to perform their jobs professionally. However, politics can have 
an adverse effect on antitrust law enforcement. In the CD-R case, some of 
Taiwan’s national legislators publicly took positions favoring the Taiwan 
licensees and demanded that the TFTC “rigorously enforce the law.” The 
Taipei Metropolitan Gas Company and CPC Jet Fuel II cases are 
important in that both monopolies are creatures of either government law 
(the metropolitan gas utility) or policy (giving the CPC decades of 
monopoly status for strategic reasons). The implication is that if Taiwan 
further liberalizes its domestic economy by embracing competition policy, 
competition law enforcement would become much easier. 
In May 2002, the leading members of the Taiwan press reported that 
the TFTC would begin an investigation of Microsoft Taiwan’s licensing 
practice.103 This case arose out of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ)’s 
crackdown on illegal software. To set a good example, the MOJ itself had 
to purchase legal software from Microsoft Taiwan. Some legislators in the 
LY then decided to politicize this issue by claiming Microsoft Taiwan 
charged monopoly rent. They then filed an official request for the TFTC to 
look into possible excessive pricing and other licensing practices of 
Microsoft Taiwan. There was no allegation of illegal exclusion of 
competitors by Microsoft Taiwan. In other words, these legislators thought 
the TFTC would find a violation of the FTL if the price was “unfair.” 
After all, they reasoned, is not that what a fair trade law is all about? 
C. Merger Control 
Merger control occupies an important position in the FTL. Taiwan 
chose to transplant Western competition law in a virtually wholesale 
manner. As a result, the integral role that merger control plays in Western 
competition law is now an integral part of the FTL. Yet, in Taiwan, the 
difficulty of developing an enlightened policy that reflects Taiwan’s 
 103. The author represents Microsoft Taiwan in this investigation. 
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smaller domestic economy complicates merger control. This issue of 
market size is more acute in the area of merger control law, as such control 
represents an incipiency measure.  
In Taiwan’s merger control regime, concerns with fairness seem to 
occupy as prominent a position as concerns with the anticompetitive 
effects of mergers. This occurs because merger control reflects a populist 
attitude towards regulating the convergence of economic resources among 
business firms as well as concerns with irregular corporate activities, such 
as related party transactions at other than arm’s length and the threat that 
larger businesses present to smaller ones. The definition of mergers, or 
“combinations,” under the FTL was affected by an Affiliated Companies 
Law bill that amended the Company Law, so as to control activities among 
groups of companies with a view to protecting creditors and minority 
shareholders!104  
For merger control purposes, Article 6 of the FTL defines a 
“combination” broadly. A combination includes: 
 (1) mergers,  
 (2) holdings or acquisitions of more than one-third of the voting 
stock or capital of another enterprise,  
 (3) a transfer or lease of all or a majority of an enterprise’s 
business or property,  
 (4) frequent joint operations with other enterprises or operating 
another enterprise at its request, and  
 (5) the exercise of direct or indirect control over the personnel, 
finance or operations of another enterprise.105 
Several problems arise with this definition. First, it is overly infatuated 
with corporate law. For example, this definition would apply to a statutory 
merger between a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary. Of 
course, such antitrust review would be meaningless, as the economic 
situation does not change with the merger of two previously affiliated 
legal entities. In addition, the fifth type of combination sweeps 
unreasonably wide to encompass cases in which firms would enjoy 
substantial influence over other firms through a combination of business 
 104. The Affiliated Companies Law bill itself was a product of transplanting German stock 
corporation law and American case law regarding piercing the corporate veil and equitable 
subordination. It was enacted as an amendment to the Company Law in 1997. 
 105. See FTL art. 6 (1992). 
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and equity arrangements.  
The overbroad sweep of the merger definitions finally was narrowed 
down in February 2002 as a result of the CEPD’s request to the author to 
overhaul laws and regulations governing mergers and acquisitions. A 
council of ministers that acts as the Premier’s think tank and economic 
policy coordinator, the CEPD accepted a Corporate Mergers and 
Acquisitions Law (CMAL) bill prepared by a team of lawyers led by the 
author. Included in the CMAL bill were provisions relating to reform of 
the FTL’s merger review provisions. 
TFTC agreed with the CMAL bill, but it requested that the FTL 
provisions be separated from this omnibus legislative bill. In its stead, the 
TFTC sponsored an FTL amendment bill that included essentially the 
same proposals for streamlining merger review. In February 2002, this 
FTL amendment became effective. One of the changes it made was to 
exclude parent subsidiaries from the merger definition, by following the 
“economic interest group” concept espoused by CEPD consultants. 
The overencompassing nature of this merger definition also produced a 
controversial interpretation—TFTC Interpretation No. 12—that tried to 
limit the application of merger control. It rendered this interpretation at the 
request of China Airlines, which proposed a joint venture travel agency 
with certain domestic travel agencies. The TFTC adopted the view in that 
interpretation that establishing a new joint venture would not fall within 
the merger control definition of the FTL. It argued that the “acquiring” 
language in Article 6(2) contemplates acquiring an interest in an existing 
entity.  
Of course, this argument is flawed. If it made sense, then the United 
States government would not have possessed grounds to review the joint 
venture proposal between Toyota and General Motors to manufacture cars 
in Fremont, California, in the early 1990s. Why then did this interpretation 
emerge? Some TFTC Commissioners (including the presiding chairman) 
wanted to avoid applying the merger control provisions too aggressively 
out of fear of its potential chilling effect on green-field investment 
projects. 
Merely meeting one of the definitions is insufficient to trigger merger 
control. The TFTC follows market share and revenue tests to determine 
the size of transactions that would constitute reportable combinations.106 A 
combination is reportable to the TFTC if any of the following conditions 
exists: 
 106. FTL art. 11.  
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(1) the combined enterprise will have a one-third market share,  
(2) one of the constituent enterprises to a combination has a one-
fourth market share, or  
(3) the sales of one of the constituent enterprises to a combination 
for the previous fiscal year exceeds the minimum revenues 
published by the TFTC.107 
In marginal cases, the market share test can present difficulties to 
merging enterprises that must bear the risks of not filing with the TFTC 
because of inaccurate calculations. The TFTC has fined several enterprises 
for their failure to file when they met the minimum revenue level, even 
though the enterprises argued that their transactions would not constitute a 
combination under the FTL.108 The minimum revenue test is more 
objective. The TFTC first set it at NT$2 billion (less than US$70 million), 
and later increased it to NT$5 billion (approximately US$170 million) in 
the mid 1990s. 
The 2002 FTL amendment, prompted by the CEPD study to reform the 
regulatory framework for mergers and acquisitions, made another 
important change. It authorized the TFTC to set different filing thresholds 
for different industries. As a result, for nonfinancial firms, the annual 
turnover threshold was changed to NT$10 billion, or about US$350 
million (while the target has to have at least NT$1 billion of turnover). For 
financial firms, the threshold now is NT$20 billion (approximately 
US$700 million). 
Until 2002, a reportable combination required TFTC approval.109 The 
TFTC essentially applied a cost-benefit analysis, and the consummation of 
a combination without obtaining TFTC approval could have led to 
divestiture, compulsory disposition of assets, cessation of business, and 
administrative fines.110  
According to an interview by the TFTC chairman in the mid-1990s, the 
TFTC had not challenged any combination on its merits.111 Toward the 
end of the TFTC’s-third term, still only four decisions had resulted in the 
disapproval of merger applications. On the other hand, during the first 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Don’t Lose Sight of the Merger Filing Threshold: Failure to File Not Only Leads to 
Fines, But Also a Bad Reputation for Business, ECON. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 13, 1994, at 2 [hereinafter 
Merger Filing Threshold]. 
 109. See FTL art. 11 (amended 2002). 
 110. FTL arts. 12-13. 
 111. See Merger Filing Threshold, supra note 108, at 2. 
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decade of the TFTC, companies making combinations submitted more 
than five thousand filings. This is amazing, and such statistics clearly 
show that overregulation occurs in the merger control area of the FTL. 
Indeed, a closer look at the TFTC’s merger control statistics reveals that 
most of those had little to do with the kind of mergers that antitrust 
authorities would be concerned with. The overwhelming majority of the 
filings concerned franchise participation cases involving corner 
convenience stores. The applications and approvals became so routine that 
the TFTC, pursuant to its fast track review procedure, even developed 
forms for its combination approvals that look like traffic tickets! 
The FTL’s overregulation of merger review became a spotlight in the 
CEPD study that led to the enactment of the CMAL. As an integral part of 
M & A regulatory reform, the TFTC was asked to shift to a clearance 
regime following the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in the United States. Under 
the FTL as amended in 2002, the approval requirement became a notice 
and thirty day waiting period. However, once challenged by a second FTC 
request, an approval would be required. This is because Taiwan’s 
administrative law practice has never required agencies to litigate in court 
to enforce their rights. Private parties not satisfied with an agency 
adjudication have to sue them to quash the adjudication! 
Other cases that led to TFTC approval of combination applications 
show the TFTC considered a wide range of factors in balancing the social 
costs and benefits of proposed mergers, as well as the effect of the 
proposed mergers on the constituent firms. The usual factors the TFTC 
considered were the enhancement of operating efficiency, improvement of 
economies of scale, improvement of financial structure or product quality, 
breakthrough from existing operating constraints, and increased 
globalization. The TFTC also evaluated benefits to industry, which 
included industry development or transformation, industry 
competitiveness, enhanced technical levels, and the opening of the market. 
Social benefits might have included improved services to consumers, 
maintenance of the original workforce or preservation of failing 
enterprises, and an improved use of public resources. When the 
applications involved conglomerate mergers, the TFTC also reviewed risk 
diversification with the interests of both creditors and investors. The TFTC 
also reviewed certain anticompetitive factors, including potential price 
increases, market concentration, trends toward product homogeneity, 
impacts on market entry, and any previous occurrences of illegal mergers 
or other restrictive practices. 
The first decade following enactment of the FTL demonstrates that the 
TFTC has developed the usual skills to review mergers. However, the 
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aforementioned lengthy list of factors suggests that such scrutiny is 
strongly formalistic and irrelevant. For example, many TFTC merger 
control decisions read like formal essays that routinely analyze the 
enumerated factors. In fact, a quick look would reveal that the TFTC 
should have approved many of these cases, as there were no 
anticompetitive risks. Many such discussions were unnecessary, as the 
TFTC did not need to concern itself too much—except in a small number 
of marginal cases—with gains internal to constituent firms. In short, the 
TFTC wasted too many resources regulating an area of competition law 
that posed no real anticompetitive threat. 
The TFTC must process cross-border merger cases more efficiently 
and expeditiously. By its very nature, merger control law is regulatory and 
often contemplates discussions and negotiations with the merger 
enforcement officials. Even though the TFTC is already experimenting 
with a fast track review practice, it could compare notes with its foreign 
counterparts to streamline its review process.112 In the area of cross-border 
merger control, the problems of the TFTC loom larger. First, the pre-
amendment low revenue thresholds captured many cross-border mergers 
that did not involve conduct or market structure in Taiwan. Second, the 
TFTC has not developed enough of an understanding of international 
business, and occasionally will form innocent questions that are either 
difficult to answer or irrelevant to the merger review. For example, during 
the TFTC’s first term, a commissioner in charge of a cross-border merger 
asked for lists of shareholders of the two merging publicly listed 
companies! In August 2000, the TFTC implemented a set of new 
guidelines governing cross-border mergers that reflected its experience to 
that point. However, the guidelines initially produced a significant level of 
confusion for the first several cross-border combination cases arising 
under them. The gist of the problem was the TFTC’s own doubt as to how 
best to address its decisions to offshore companies that did not operate 
direct branches in Taiwan. 
Of the four TFTC decisions that rejected the combination approvals, 
three involved CATV system operators. In Taiwan, the CATV industry 
cropped up in the late 1980s for two reasons. First, as Taiwan began to 
democratize, the ruling party, the KMT, still controlled the media. 
Opposition politicians tried to break this chokehold through community 
cable television systems, often even illegally. Second, terrestrial television 
has not maintained high quality programming, and consumers began 
 112. Id. 
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exploring other means (including satellite-streaming programs from 
abroad) to satisfy the demand for content. The Seoul Olympiad of 1988 
was the watershed event, as that year saw the mushrooming of small-dish 
satellites on virtually every rooftop in Taiwan. However, markets were 
developing without a law permitting the industry to exist. Indeed, even 
today, the CATV industry members bear a casual description as the 
“fourth stations,” that is, illegal stations other than the three legal, state-
affiliated terrestrial stations! 
When the Government Information Office (GIO) began to license and 
regulate the CATV industry in the mid-1990s, an industry owned by local 
politicians and other local interests was formed. As a result of political 
compromises, the CATV Law and GIO regulations divide Taiwan into 
fifty-one franchise areas, with up to five system operators for each area. In 
addition, in the name of cultural security and fair competition, the CATV 
Law imposed foreign ownership limitations (which were relaxed in 2001) 
as well as ownership diversification requirements. These rules were 
doomed to create problems, as they prevented system operators from 
attaining economies of scale. In fact, ownership limits were very 
formalistic and the TFTC only reviewed one layer of ownership until the 
CATV Law amendment in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, keen competition 
and integration between content providers and system operators led to 
territorial disputes and the termination of program licensing contracts 
towards the end of the year, which angered consumers and dismayed 
senior government officials. 
Analysts should review the three TFTC rejections of merger 
applications by these CATV operators against the background of industry 
consolidation. For example, a practice emerged among multiple system 
operators (MSOs) in the mid-1990s to create a network of affiliated 
system operators through holding companies and other ownership 
arrangements. The CATV Law amendment in the late 1990s also added a 
one-third threshold for the national market in terms of subscribers and 
other indicia. Such industry consolidation often necessitates the transfer of 
ownership or control. As indicated above, Article 6 of the FTL would 
capture such activity as a merger subject to TFTC review. In these three 
cases, even though the TFTC understood the efficiency gains that would 
arise from such proposed mergers, the “wild west” image of the first 
generation of system operators as well as the anti-business (known as anti-
zaibatsu) impression of the subscribing public troubled it. More 
importantly, the TFTC remained unsure whether operators would launch 
another “year-end program termination war,” which would create 
tremendous pressure from the Premier to seek enforcement action. 
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Due to the formalism of the ownership limitation rules and the de facto 
use of multiple layers of ownership, combining firms may bypass TFTC 
review altogether. In a clever move, a proposed system operator filed a 
combination application with the TFTC before actually implementing the 
investment. After the TFTC granted approval, news reports suggested that 
the beneficial ownership behind the applicant belonged to the Carlyle 
group from the United States, even though its name never appeared in the 
applications.113 
The only non-CATV rejection of a combination application was a letter 
to the CPC in November 1997. In this letter, the TFTC took the “tentative 
position” that until the government began to permit the importation of 
petroleum, the TFTC would not permit joint ventures or new companies to 
establish gas stations involving the CPC as a party or shareholder. The 
CPC’s monopoly in Taiwan has lasted for decades. In the mid-1990s, 
Taiwan finally adopted a long-awaited petroleum product liberalization 
plan that aimed to open this market in stages. The first stage began with 
the free importation of fuel, jet fuel, and crude oil in 1999, and the second 
stage allowed for the free importation of diesel and other petroleum 
products in 2000. The CPC’s new gas station plan proposed to expand its 
market penetration from its 50.2% market share at the time.  
The CPC case provides several interesting points. First, the CPC is a 
state-owned monopoly. This suggests that the government should privatize 
and deregulate the petroleum market, which would render FTL 
enforcement much easier. Second, the TFTC obviously was ensuring that 
the CPC would not preempt the government’s petroleum market-opening 
schedule using any countermeasures. In other words, the TFTC wanted to 
ensure a level playing field. Third, the formal TFTC statistics do not 
identify this decision as a rejection. The decision only appeared in the 
TFTC Gazette, perhaps to save face for the CPC.114 Fourth, this letter 
served as a blanket rejection of all potential applications that the CPC 
might file in this particular market. In other words, the TFTC made it 
painfully clear that it would not revisit this issue every time the CPC filed 
a combination application. 
The TFTC’s enforcement of merger controls suggests that a consistent 
body of case law has yet to be developed. As indicated above, until 2002, 
 113. For details on Taiwan Broadband Communications Co.’s proposed acquisition of Southern 
Taoyuan CATV, see Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 88-Kung-Chieh-0704, 8 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR 
TRADE COMM’N, Aug. 1999, at 128-32.  
 114. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 86-Kung-Erh-04181, 6 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Nov. 1997, at 113. 
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the TFTC required approval for mergers between parent and subsidiary 
companies, even though no additional economic integration of resources 
occurred. In other words, the TFTC followed a legalistic approach to 
enterprises and combinations.115 This may not be the TFTC’s fault; the 
text of the FTL’s pre-2002 merger control provisions seems to capture the 
merger of any two companies.  
Ironically, the same legalistic approach led to an interpretative ruling, 
mentioned above, that different enterprises setting up a joint venture 
company to engage in a new business would not constitute a combination 
within the meaning of the FTL.116 The rationale—which possesses factual 
and theoretical flaws—is that, legalistically, when the combination is 
proposed, the joint venture company does not yet exist and the FTL’s 
merger control provisions only apply to existing entities. This 
interpretation in essence created a blind spot for merger control whenever 
a new joint venture company is proposed. However, another perspective of 
this result remains interesting. The TFTC cannot justify its interpretation 
by any fundamental theory in economics, but it provides virtually all new 
joint ventures among competitors with a free hand. Indeed, this 
interpretation seems to contradict the TFTC’s position in its November 
1997 letter regarding a tentative, blanket rejection of all combination 
approvals that the CPC might submit pursuant to its proposed investment 
project for gas stations. More importantly, the position of this 
interpretative ruling indicates the TFTC’s concern with its own legitimate 
role in merger control. 
Other perverse results also follow the same legalistic approach. As 
previously indicated, franchise participation cases made up most of the 
merger control cases. The TFTC held that conduct of the President 
Enterprises Corporation (PEC), a major food processing company, in 
granting franchises to franchisees to open 7-11 convenience stores 
triggered the TFTC’s approval requirement each time the PEC planned to 
open a new franchise. Again, the TFTC’s filing requirement’s lack of a 
“size of transaction” test that would screen out mergers with insignificant 
market impact produced this problem.117 Interestingly, the TFTC has not 
chosen to either review all such serial, ongoing franchise licensing cases in 
their totality, or explore whether, in the aggregate, these combinations 
 115. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-021, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Aug. 1992, at 34. 
 116. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-012, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, July 1992, at 24. 
 117. The TFTC has granted dozens of such approvals, which read like standard forms. 
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would be anticompetitive to traditional groceries and sidewalk produce 
stands. The TFTC should consider examining the “forest” all at once, 
rather than simply review each “tree” as it is planted.  
III. CARTELS, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
A. Controlling and Punishing Horizontal Cartels 
The FTL bases its cartel regulation on the German GWB and European 
Union models. It defines a “concerted action” broadly to regulate joint 
activities between competing enterprises.118 A concerted action refers to a 
horizontal action among firms at the same level of production that may 
affect how supply and demand for the relevant goods and services interact 
in the market. However, the Implementing Rules seek to exclude cartels 
among competitors that lack adequate market power from antitrust 
scrutiny.119 In an unpublished decision, the TFTC held that two 
transportation companies, each possessing less than 1% of market share, 
would not violate the FTL by fixing the rates of their freight.120 Whether 
the FTL authorizes the TFTC to adopt Implementing Rules leading to this 
result is debatable. 
The FTL seeks to both punish and regulate horizontal cartels. It sets out 
a general “per se” illegality principle by stating that competing enterprises 
may not engage in concerted actions to restrict prices, quantities, 
customers, territories, or otherwise restrict each other’s commercial 
activities.121 However, an extensive proviso followed this prohibition, 
allowing seven specific exceptions where, after the TFTC grants an 
approval after assessing the general economic benefits and public interest, 
it could legalize such cartels. These seven exceptions all require the TFTC 
to perform a rule of reason analysis. The TFTC proposed two additional 
exceptions, one for a general application and the other to apply to trade 
associations’ self-regulatory practices, in a draft bill to amend the FTL. 
Concerted actions that may be legalized are: 
(1) standardization cartels for products or models in order to 
reduce costs, improve quality, or enhance efficiency; 
 118. FTL art. 7. 
 119. See Implementing Rules art. 2. 
 120. See Resolution of the 91st Meeting of the Fair Trade Commission (on file with author). 
 121. FTL art. 14. 
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(2) research or marketing cartels to upgrade technology, 
improve quality, reduce costs, or enhance efficiency; 
(3) specialization cartels for enterprises to engage in separate 
specializations so as to facilitate rationalization; 
(4) export cartels applicable to foreign markets to ensure or 
facilitate exports; 
(5) import cartels for the joint importation of foreign goods in 
order to improve the effect of trade; 
(6) recession cartels that allow competing enterprises to 
jointly restrict output, sales, equipment, or prices pursuant 
to a plan to meet demand during an economic recession 
when market prices for goods are lower than the average 
production cost, and enterprises in that industry 
experience difficulties in surviving or with excess 
production; and 
(7) small business cartels to improve operational efficiency or 
enhance competitiveness.122 
In granting its approvals to concerted actions, which expire after a 
maximum of three years, the TFTC may impose conditions and require 
modifications as a precondition of approval. However, the TFTC may not 
grant block exemptions, nor does it regularly grant negative clearances. 
Application for an interpretative ruling as to the applicability of the cartel 
regulation provisions is theoretically possible, but can be very time 
consuming. These factors suggest that obtaining an approval may require 
substantial bureaucratic efforts.  
As of this writing, there is very little joint importation of grains. 
Therefore, one suspects that Taiwan’s business community routinely may 
disregard their requirement when forming arrangements among competing 
enterprises that may be pro-competitive and, therefore, permissible under 
the FTL. The substantial burden to furnish sensitive information and 
uncertainty with the result of a rule of reason analysis may constitute the 
reasons. 
The TFTC has taken only a few enforcement actions against 
anticompetitive cartels, such as those fixing the price of eggs in eastern 
counties of the Province of Taiwan and fixing interest rates in the lending 
 122. Id. 
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market among credit cooperatives in Kaohsiung. An investigation of the 
three listed monopolies engaging in short-term bill financing ended 
without any enforcement action because, even though the three firms 
offered the same interest rates, one could expect such a result in an 
oligopolistic market where interdependence among firms exists.  
The primary difficulty in this case is one of proof: the TFTC was 
unable to obtain evidence of actual agreements among competing bill 
finance companies to fix interest rates. Nonetheless, following its moral 
suasion and competition advocacy program, the TFTC currently is 
advocating further deregulation of this market segment that it believes is 
the solution to this case. For example, a bid rigging case involving more 
than sixty enterprises (and even gangsters) in the market for the supply of 
cables and wire to Taiwan’s sole electricity supplier, Taipower 
Corporation, came under TFTC investigation.123  
Looking back at cartel enforcement under the FTL, the first impression 
is that the TFTC generally has done a good job in creating public 
awareness of the illegality of cartels. As noted above, the FTL specifically 
lists trade associations as an “enterprise” under the FTL.124 Cartels are 
often the product of conspiracies arranged through trade associations; 
therefore, the inclusive definition has the important effect of making trade 
associations and their representatives accountable under the FTL. This 
enhances the deterrent effect of the cartel control provisions. 
Second, illegal cartel cases represent only about 4% of the 
approximately fifteen hundred cases where the TFTC has sanctioned 
illegal conduct. It is difficult to objectively gauge how robust the cartel 
enforcement program is relative to overall TFTC enforcement. However, a 
recent study conducted by the TFTC itself suggests the increasing 
difficulty posed by cartel enforcement is due to the evidentiary problem of 
proving the existence of collusion.125 In this statistical analysis conducted 
by TFTC staff members, 109 representative cases were studied. The 
sample included 32 cases in which the TFTC found illegal conduct and 77 
cases in which the TFTC did not produce sufficient evidence of illegality. 
The study examined factors such as industry structure, product features, 
entry barriers, differences in cost structure, market differentiation, modes 
of production, and consumer patterns to look for variables that would 
 123. See 61 Companies Alleged to Engage in Bid Rigging, COMMERCIAL TIMES, Jan. 4, 1994, at 
30. 
 124. See supra note 51. 
 125. See Tay-cheng Ma and The-chang Hung, An Analysis of the Decision of Collusive Cases 
Made by the Fair Trade Law, FAIR TRADE Q., Apr. 2001, at 37. 
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support a finding of illegality by the TFTC.  
The study found that the cartel prohibition rule of the FTL offers an 
effective deterrent. Interestingly, it found that TFTC investigations and 
sanctions against illegal cartels occurred more frequently in more 
competitive markets, which puzzled the staff as being inconsistent with 
industrial organization theory. The study also found that cases involving 
regional markets and possessing oligopolistic features created an increased 
likelihood of TFTC prosecution. A third finding suggests that small 
businesses in the form of sole proprietorships or partnerships with owners 
that lacked an advanced educational background were more likely to suffer 
sanctions from the TFTC. On the other hand, major firms seemed to have 
a better understanding of the FTL and, therefore, finding an agreement or 
explicit collusion to cartelize proved more difficult. Conscious parallelism 
was more likely in cases involving these bigger firms.  
In the future, the TFTC might focus more of its enforcement resources 
on cartel prosecution. Improvement is likely if the TFTC conserves its 
enforcement resources by streamlining other enforcement programs 
(including merger control). 
Third, the TFTC should intensify its cooperation with prosecutors to 
enhance joint enforcement against illegal cartels. As an administrative 
agency, the TFTC does not possess any criminal investigative powers. It 
therefore would have to rely on prosecutors to share part of the 
investigative burden. In this regard, the TFTC may have fallen prey to its 
own devices, as it was responsible for an amendment to the FTL that 
required all criminal prosecutions to follow a TFTC referral. Although this 
TFTC-first policy does not eliminate criminal prosecution, it does push the 
TFTC to the forefront. When it refers a case to prosecutors for formal 
indictment, it should possess enough evidence at that point to make 
prosecution an easier task. 
Fourth, the TFTC should review the procedure for legalizing cartels 
under Article 14 of the FTL and propose an amendment for improvement. 
The primary problem with Article 14 is that it requires prior TFTC 
approval to legalize cartels. This represents perhaps the most 
disenchanting aspect of European antitrust influence on Taiwan. However, 
the European Union is undergoing its own reform to streamline its cartel 
legalization program. The United States requires no such prior approval, 
allowing for the issuance of informal business letters. This informal 
process is better, as it prevents the challenge of pro-competitive 
collaboration among competitors simply due to a lack of government 
approval. 
Fifth, certain types of cartels should not receive classifications as 
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justifiable cartels. Examples include joint exports, joint imports, 
depression cartels, and specialization cartels. Indeed, one should view any 
cartels relating to international trade with suspicion, and Taiwan should be 
careful not to run afoul of the WTO because Taiwan is easily susceptible 
to trade retaliation. Other types of cartels like depression cartels give the 
government a reason to intervene, which actually leads to procrastination 
in making the painful adjustment in economic downtime. 
Sixth, Article 14 should be amended to broaden other possibilities for 
allowing pro-competitive collaboration among competitors. Currently, the 
FTL specifically enumerates seven grounds on which to obtain TFTC 
approval for cartels, with the exception of the small business exemption. 
In the legislative debate leading to the enactment of the FTL, arguments 
were made as to whether it was appropriate to create a general category of 
antitrust exemptions just for small businesses. At the urging of a German-
trained legislator, who relied on the argument of a German-trained law 
professor, Article 14(7) became the small business exemption from cartel 
activities. In fact, it would be rather difficult to justify an antitrust 
exemption for small businesses to fix prices illegally on efficiency 
grounds. Nonetheless, the TFTC actually did just that. It adopted a set of 
guidelines to allow tire shops to fix prices for retreading tires! In the 
future, legislators should revamp Article 14(7) as part of the Article 14 
overhaul, so that it will legalize all efficiency-enhancing horizontal 
arrangements regardless of the status of the enterprises involved. 
B. Vertical and Other Restraints 
The FTL contains provisions that deal with issues such as vertical price 
and non-price restraints, exclusionary practices, and other restraints and 
practices often applied in a distribution arrangement. Interestingly, even 
though authorities often treat such provisions as antitrust issues, the FTL 
essentially treats them as rules against unfair competition.126 This 
arrangement reflects an apparent influence from the Japanese 
Antimonopoly Law.127 It also suggests that ensuring adequate competition 
and a fair balance of different parties’ interest in the distribution market 
constitutes a legislative purpose of both Chinese competition laws. In 
1999, Taiwan amended the FTL to add the phrase “restricting 
competition” to Article 19, the operating provision of the FTL governing 
 126. These provisions reside in Chapter III of the FTL, which regulates unfair competition.  
 127. See HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 92-110 
(1983). 
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vertical and other restraints. However, it remains unclear whether this 
amendment will change the previous enforcement position of treating 
these restraints as a form of unfair competition.  
To this end, the FTL nullifies resale price maintenance (RPM)128 and, 
as interpreted by the TFTC, prohibits such conduct by allowing for TFTC-
issued administrative fines.129 Even though the FTL creates a theoretical 
exception for the TFTC to list daily consumer goods for which adequate 
competition exists, the TFTC has yet to utilize this exception. In addition, 
the FTL contains a similar provision (albeit one that provides for criminal 
sanctions) that prohibits an enterprise from imposing unreasonable 
restraints on the commercial activities of its counterparties.130 Such 
restraints include tying, exclusive dealing, and restraints relating to 
customers, territories, and field of use. Much like the FTL’s anti-cartel 
provisions, Article 19(6) adopts a rule of reason approach, requiring an 
examination of the parties’ intent, purpose, market position, market 
structure, the characteristics of its goods or services, and the effects of the 
restraints.131 
Due to the perceived relation between RPM arrangements to price 
levels and inflationary pressure, the TFTC adopted an aggressive 
campaign against RPM arrangements. The anti-RPM rule is perhaps the 
only rule of per se illegality in the FTL; it only requires proof of the 
RPM’s existence (which the TFTC quite often can obtain from provisions 
in distribution agreements of the uninitiated producers). The most 
prominent enforcement actions against RPM arrangements involved the 
aforementioned imported cosmetics cases. A body of case law is emerging 
from TFTC decisions that involve non-price restraints, in which the TFTC 
engages in a market analysis. 
The FTL prohibits an enterprise from using “improper inducement” to 
cause a counterparty to transact business with it instead of other 
competitors.132 As interpreted by the TFTC, offering prizes and gifts in 
connection with the sale of goods likely would constitute an offense.133 In 
a case involving a newspaper offering apportionments of gold worth 
several million Taiwan dollars as lottery prizes to new subscribers, the 
TFTC conducted a careful market analysis. It then concluded that, 
 128. FTL art. 18. 
 129. FTL art. 41. 
 130. FTL art. 19(6). 
 131. See Implementing Rules art. 24. 
 132. FTL art. 19(3). See also supra note 49. 
 133. See, e.g., Fair Trade Comm’n, Interpretation No. Kung-Yen-020, 1 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR 
TRADE COMM’N, Aug. 1992, at 33. 
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although such conduct could violate the FTL when the prizes became the 
primary reason motivating the purchase, the case actually represented the 
pro-competitive situation of a smaller firm seeking to lure more business 
away from the two established, more popular newspapers. 
The upholding of this promotional campaign clarifies some prior 
interpretations suggesting that giving prizes and price premiums may be 
illegal under Article 19(3) of the FTL. Once again, Article 19(3) illustrates 
the FTL’s struggle between balancing efficiency and fairness, which is 
unthinkable in a country like the United States. However, due to the 
influence from a similar statute like the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, a 
pro-competitive practice designed to create allocative efficiency may 
constitute unfair competition in Taiwan. 
C. Discriminatory Treatment 
The FTL prohibits discriminatory treatment in two provisions. One 
appears within the aforementioned anti-monopolization rules;134 the other 
prohibits unjustifiable discrimination as a general rule insofar as it may 
result in unfair competition.135 Presumably, this prohibition prohibits not 
only price discrimination but non-price discrimination as well. Thus, the 
FTL operates differently from statutes like the Robinson-Patman Act 
(RPA) in the United States, which requires price differences to establish a 
prima facie case.136 Charging the same price could still constitute a form of 
economic price discrimination, but it would not constitute a violation of 
the RPA.137 In contrast, the FTL provides no such assurance.  
Like other FTL provisions, Article 19(2) follows a rule of reason 
approach, and one can find justifications for this approach by examining, 
for example, the supply and demand in the market, cost differential, the 
volume of the transaction, and credit risks.138 The TFTC has decided 
several cases in this area, with the aforementioned CPC Jet Fuel cases 
representing two of the leading cases. Some unpublished TFTC decisions 
suggest that the TFTC is developing a theory of cross-border 
discrimination that may violate Article 19(2) or the general prohibition of 
Article 24. However, even in the European Union, “[c]harging different 
prices in different countries does not, in itself, infringe article 85 [of the 
 134. FTL art. 10(3). 
 135. FTL art. 19(2). 
 136. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1994).  
 137. See ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A 
NUTSHELL 408 (4th ed. 1994). 
 138. See Implementing Rules art. 24. 
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Treaty of Rome] . . .”139 
In another case, a petitioner alleged to the TFTC that the state-owned 
CHT adopted a very selective standard for technical services in the 
computer graphic systems of telecommunications networks and sporadic 
point accumulation operations. In 1997, the TFTC found that CHT 
adopted this selective standard for vendors of technical services that could 
become qualified bidders when it still operated as a part of the DGT before 
the telecommunications reform of 1996. The TFTC found that such a 
bidder qualification standard violated the FTL. However, because of 
CHT’s recent reorganization and its lack of intent to erect an entry barrier 
for the provision of such services, the TFTC did not punish it.140 
The CHT case shows favoritism and similar irregularities in the state-
owned sector that reflects years of foreclosure from competition. A similar 
unlawful discrimination case arose around the same time and involved the 
Environmental Protection Agency of the Taipei City Government in a bid 
for garbage cans. Acting on complaints, the TFTC found that the Taipei 
City EPA designated a single company to provide garbage cans without 
going through a proper bidding competition. However, according to the 
TFTC’s own guidelines governing procurement and other private law 
activities of public agencies, these agencies do not constitute enterprises 
within the meaning of the FTL. Therefore, the TFTC referred the 
Environmental Protection Agency to the Taipei City Government for self-
rectifying conduct.141 
In another market sector, the heavily regulated CATV market, the 
TFTC also found pervasive discriminatory practices. In the Hsin Shih Po 
Cable Broadcast System Corp. case involving program licensing, the 
TFTC found that a regional distributor of CATV programming products 
discriminated against different system operators.142 
D. Unfair Competition in General 
Unfair competition cases constitute a significant portion of FTL 
enforcement actions. However, the FTL labels many practices as acts of 
 139. Margot Horspool & Valentine Korah, Competition, 37 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 337, 342 
(1992). 
 140. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd., 2 CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
FAIR TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 73-75 (2000). 
 141. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Taipei City Government Bureau of Environmental Protection, 2 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE FAIR TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 77-78 (2000). 
 142. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Hsin Shih Po Cable Broadcast System Corp., 2 CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE FAIR TRADE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 78-82 (2000). 
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unfair competition that antitrust rules generally would govern. The FTL 
also fills in the gap left by other laws. One example is the offense of 
passing off, which attempts to address the issue of protecting trade dress 
where the more traditional protection of intellectual property law may 
prove inadequate. 
The public generally must know the commercial symbol or appearance 
that is being exploited unlawfully, which defines the context of unfair 
competition and sharpens the risks of free riding on the commercial 
goodwill of others. In addition, there is a special rule prohibiting the use of 
famous foreign trademarks, in which case the owner need not prove 
consumer confusion, which the FTL inherently presumes in such a case.  
On the other hand, if the misappropriated commercial symbol is a 
registered trademark in Taiwan, Taiwan’s Trademark Law will subsume 
the FTL’s passing off offense. In addition, the FTL provides several 
exceptions to the rule against passing off where one can demonstrate that, 
for example, a customary, generic use of the commercial symbol or the 
good faith use of one’s name in connection with the sale of goods or 
provision of services occurred. 
The fact that Taiwan’s prohibition against passing off refers to 
consumer confusion presents another problem: it remains unclear whether 
the standard reaches potential confusion or necessitates actual confusion. 
Providing proof of actual detriment or confusion could be difficult. In 
Taiwan, the parties to enforcement actions now contemplate polling 
consumers to satisfy this evidentiary requirement. 
The FTL prohibits the knowing commission of either false advertising 
or circulation of fraudulent or misleading information by business 
operators or advertising agencies (e.g. the media).143 Although both 
provisions appear in the chapter governing unfair competition, they 
actually operate more like direct consumer protection provisions. Unlike 
the rule against passing off, there may not be an actual infringement of any 
competitor’s commercial symbol in this situation, which could make 
proving a detriment to competitors more difficult. 
The FTL prohibits an enterprise from using improper inducement or 
incentives to cause the other party to transact business with it.144 It 
nevertheless fails to delineate clearly the means by which one enterprise 
may unfairly interfere with a competitor’s advantageous trade relations 
with a third party.  
 143. FTL art. 21. 
 144. FTL art. 19(3). See also supra note 49. 
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The FTL also prohibits trade libel.145 Its language, however, is unclear 
as to whether a violation requires knowledge that information is false.  
Trade secret protection serves as an important means to ensuring 
proper competition in the ROC. However, Taiwan’s FTL does not define 
trade secrets, and due to the inappropriate placement in the FTL of the rule 
protecting trade secrets, the TFTC must issue a cease-and-desist order 
prior to meting out sanctions.146 As a result, this prohibition has lost much 
of its bite. 
The FTL punishes illegal multilevel distribution arrangements and 
authorizes the TFTC to adopt rules that regulate permissible multilevel 
distribution arrangements.147 This reflects Taiwan’s painful experience 
with the Pomzi-style pyramid sales schemes in the 1980s that many 
ordinary citizens motivated by greed lost their savings to. Multilevel 
distribution still constitutes big business in Taiwan. A TFTC study shows 
that direct selling is big business. The popularity of this distribution 
arrangement belies the social traits and networking ability of the Chinese.  
E. The Catchall Rule Against Deceptive and Unconscionable Conduct 
Unfair competition can take many forms; thus, Article 24 of the FTL 
contains a catchall provision that prohibits, in addition to those violations 
specifically enumerated in the legislation, other deceptive and obviously 
unconscionable acts that may affect the orderly conditions for transacting 
business.148 There was logic to this provision: the restricted nature of the 
offense compensates for the breadth of its prohibition. The TFTC may 
impose only administrative sanctions, and violating conduct does not 
constitute a criminal offense. As such, Article 24 follows Section 5 of the 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act in text and spirit.149 The TFTC’s 
recent focus on this provision also suggests its potential as a direct 
measure for consumer protection. As a catchall remedy, Article 24 could 
capture conduct that falls slightly short of a prima facie violation of other 
countries’ rules in competition legislation.  
The logic of having a vaguely worded catchall rule supported by 
 145. FTL art. 22. 
 146. The general protective provision for trade secrets in the Fair Trade Law is Article 19(5). 
 147. FTL art. 23. 
 148. FTL art. 24. 
 149. Compare FTL art. 24 (“In addition to what is provided for in this Law, no enterprise shall 
otherwise have any deceptive or obviously unfair conduct that is able to affect trading order”) with 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1999) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”). 
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administrative sanctions ceased with the 1999 FTL amendment. This 
amendment required all criminal prosecutions arising under the FTL to 
follow an administrative adjudication by the TFTC.150 As a practical 
matter, most FTL issues became administrative law disputes that the 
TFTC monopolized control over. Criminal prosecutions became even 
more infrequent. When all FTL violations became administrative law 
violations, there was no logic for having a rule like Article 24, whose 
vagueness had become glaringly annoying. 
There is more than just the TFTC’s own goal of monopolizing FTL 
enforcement through this amendment that led to the smorgasbord style of 
Article 24 enforcement. For example, the actual enforcement history of the 
FTL shows that the TFTC wavers in difficult or borderline cases, 
primarily those involving large companies, SOEs, and novel issues that 
one cannot categorize easily. As the foregoing discussion shows, all 
antitrust offenses arising under Articles 10 (monopolization), 14 (cartel-
like conduct), 18 (resale price maintenance), and 19 (boycott conduct, 
refusal to deal, discrimination, and other vertical restraints) overlap with 
Article 24. Likewise, Article 24 could capture and subsume Article 20 
(passing off) and Article 21 (false advertising). Such situations thus lend 
themselves to an effort by the TFTC to sweep these cases under the Article 
24 rug.  
As a result, the TFTC invoked Article 24 to punish franchised 
convenience stores for demanding a “storefront fee” from brand owners 
whose products they carry.151 The TFTC subjected hospitals allowing 
“most favored customer” treatment to certain medical suppliers to the 
same sanction.152 Other Article 24 case law involves the bad faith 
termination of display contracts by vertically integrated content providers 
in order to pressure cable television system operators,153 as well as refusals 
by photocopiers possessing a strong market position to provide parts to 
independent service providers.154 In substance, this line of decisions 
represents a series of antitrust offenses involving firms with different 
levels of market power, which the TFTC could have disposed of by 
 150. FTL arts. 35-36. 
 151. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 86-Kung-Chu-036, 6 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Mar. 1997, at 34. 
 152. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 89-Kung-Chu-103, 9 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, July 2000, at 158. 
 153. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 87-Kung-Chu-039, 7 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Feb. 1998, at 29. 
 154. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Letter No. 86-Kung-Erh-85-022821011, 6 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR 
TRADE COMM’N, Mar. 1997, at 58. 
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invoking other, more well-defined provisions of the FTL. 
Another line of Article 24 case law captures unfair methods of 
competition. Again, other FTL rules appear to be more specific and 
relevant. However, the TFTC used Article 24 to challenge cybersquatting 
on popular domain names,155 passing off,156 blatant plagiarism,157 the 
frivolous distribution of warning letters by intellectual property right 
owners,158 free riding on another’s efforts,159 and wholesalers engaging in 
retail businesses despite the lack of necessary operating licenses.160 
The third line of Article 24 case law essentially deals with contractual 
relationships in which information asymmetry or other phenomena of 
disparate bargaining positions exist. For example, the TFTC has 
intervened in cases involving improper sales promotion,161 consumer 
contracts for pre-sale housing units,162 real estate brokerage 
commissions,163 and standard terms contracts for users of financial 
services.164 A pattern of conduct may justify invocation of Article 24, as 
these cases involving the rights and obligations of private parties do not 
represent isolated events.  
Despite its theoretical problems, Taiwan’s emerging Article 24 
jurisprudence illustrates the importance of consumer protection. The 
aforementioned second and third lines of Article 24 case law reflect the 
TFTC’s strong desire to react promptly and effectively to consumer 
 155. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 89-Kung-Chu-036, 9 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, May 2000, at 137. 
 156. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 89-Kung-Chu-090, 9 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, July 2000, at 82. 
 157. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 89-Kung-Chu-114, 9 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Oct. 2000, at 17. 
 158. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 89-Kung-Chu-134, 9 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Sept. 2000, at 12. 
 159. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 85-Kung-Ch-130, 5 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Oct. 1996, at 6. 
 160. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 87-Kung-Chu-139, 7 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, June 1998, at 69. 
 161. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 87-Kung-Chu-073, 7 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Mar. 1998, at 27. 
 162. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 84-Kung-Chu-008, 4 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, Jan. 1995, at 27. 
 163. See Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision No. 89-Kung-Chu-062, 9 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE 
COMM’N, May 2000, at 118. 
 
 164. These enforcement guidelines appear in the Guidelines Governing the Rectification of 
Processing of Overdue Time Deposits by Banks and Relevant Information Disclosure, and the 
Guidelines Governing the Rectification of Handling of Demand by Banks on Checking Account 
Deposits to Maintain Minimum Balance and Relevant Information Disclosure. See Fair Trade 
Comm’n, Letter No. 84-Kung-Yi-00108, 4 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE COMM’N, Feb. 1995, at 84; 
Fair Trade Comm’n, Letter No. 84-Kung-Yi-01933, 4 GAZETTE OF THE FAIR TRADE COMM’N, Mar. 
1995, at 135. 
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concerns. As a related legislative measure, in early 1994, Taiwan enacted 
the Consumer Protection Law (CPL), which contains strict liability for 
defective goods, defective services, and product recalls, regulates 
unconscionable standard contract terms, and provides for punitive 
damages and class action relief.165 Viewing the legislative history, 
legislators of the LY (rather than the EY) originally sponsored the CPL 
bill. At the time of the legislative debates, the KMT still controlled both 
the EY and LY, but Taiwan rapidly was becoming a robust civil society. 
The CPL bill was the creation of the Consumer Protection Foundation 
(CPF), a nongovernmental organization set up in the early 1980s to 
combat an undue national emphasis on producer welfare.  
The Consumer Protection Commission, which was created under the 
CPL, possesses a unique organizational structure, which reflects a political 
compromise made during the enactment of the CPL. Chaired by the Vice 
Premier the Consumer Protection Commission employs a staff of only a 
few dozen officials and is only responsible for policy coordination. The 
Consumer Protection Commission placed the actual responsibility for 
enforcing the CPL with relevant agencies and local governments.166 The 
whole purpose of this arrangement, not unlike the background behind the 
reluctant passage of the FTL a few years earlier, was to preemptively 
prevent consumerism in Taiwan from getting out of hand.  
A plan has existed since the late 1990s to merge the Consumer 
Protection Commission into the TFTC, which likely would be the 
survivor. This proposal would streamline the work among different 
agencies in relation to the prohibition of unfair competition and consumer 
protection. However, political considerations and bureaucratic opposition 
have placed this proposal, which includes streamlining other government 
agencies, in a stalemate. Recently, in 2002, the DPP government revived 
this merger proposal under a comprehensive government reengineering 
plan. 
 165. The CPL constituted a reaction against the pro-growth, anti-redistribution economic policy of 
Taiwan during its postwar development. One indicator of this backlash is that the CPL provides strict 
liability even for defective services. This rule is not well grounded in theory or comparative law. Due 
to the difficulty in standardizing the rendition of services, a negligence standard usually is applied for 
liability arising under the performance of services. 
 166. For example, the SFC would possess responsibility for investor protection as part of its 
administrative duties under both the CPL and SEL. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 77 Liu book pages .doc  10/14/02   4:25 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
140   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:77 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM 
A. Civil Liability 
Antitrust laws in the Anglo-American world have had a long history as 
part of the common law. Civil liability and private sector enforcement 
constitute a very important feature of competition law enforcement. In 
contrast, Taiwan’s competition law provides for apparently strong but 
practically weak civil relief. The FTL specifically grants standing to any 
injured person.167 Theoretically, even consumers could sue in a price 
fixing case, so long as they can prove a direct injury. On the other hand, 
courts rely on and progressively develop traditional tort rules to handle 
one-on-one disputes. However, Taiwanese courts do not possess civil 
procedure rules (such as those pertaining to class actions) to deal with 
mass tort litigation. In fact, the traditional Chinese solution to mass 
litigation is through direct government regulation or ownership.  
One recent indicator of change is the CPL rules that allow 
representative, parens patriae actions by recognized consumer groups on 
behalf of consumers in general,168 as well as class actions if injured 
consumers decide to opt in.169 For example, since the late 1990s, the 
Securities and Futures Market Development Institute, an SFC-supported 
nonprofit foundation, has embarked upon a program that works to achieve 
functionally the same class action procedure of the United States as a way 
to protect investors. It would solicit claims to deal with “opt in” problems. 
It also would piggyback a civil claim on behalf of victimized investors on 
the coattails of the public prosecutor’s criminal prosecution of the same 
offense.170 However, while Taiwan’s CPL contains a groundbreaking 
provision that waives substantial court fees in the case of a representative 
action by consumer protection groups, the FTL contains no similar waiver 
provision.171 Therefore, an injured party seeking damages in a Taiwanese 
district court must prepay the district court fees equal to 1% of the claimed 
amount. For appeals to the Taiwan High Court and the Supreme Court, it 
must prepay another fee for 1% and 1.5% of the claimed amount, 
respectively. 
 167. FTL art. 32. 
 168. Consumer Protection Law art. 49 (1994) [hereinafter CPL]. An English translation of the 
CPL is available at http://www.virtual-asia.com/taiwan/bizpack/legalcodes/consumer_protection.htm. 
 169. CPL art. 54. 
 170. See Lawrence Liu, Simulating Securities Class Actions: The Case in Taiwan, CORP. 
GOVERNANCE INT’L, Dec. 2000, at 4-12. 
 171. CPL art. 52.  
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The FTL specifically provides for permanent and provisional injunctive 
relief.172 Taiwan’s injunctive relief for a violation of the FTL originates 
from the Taiwanese Civil Code rule protecting property rights in 
general.173 Comparable provisions exist in Taiwan’s intellectual property 
laws.174 However, allowing competitors or consumers to apply this 
provision in an antitrust context could result in either anticompetitive 
behavior or disruption, as injunctive relief is an ex ante remedy that 
actually could restrain competition if awarded erroneously. However, in 
the first decade since passage of the FTL, this has not been a problem. The 
domination of the TFTC in this field has weakened overall civil liability 
enforcement. No party to a major case has ever sought injunctive relief as 
a remedy. 
The FTL provides for compensatory damages and constructive 
damages, which allow an injured enterprise to recover profits resulting 
from an anticompetitive act if actual damages are difficult to determine.175 
Similar remedies exist in Taiwan’s Civil Code and Company Law for the 
misappropriation of business opportunities and unfair competition by 
directors and managers, and in Taiwan’s Patent Law and Trademark Law 
to assess damages for infringement. 
Competition law enforcement often involves collusion and undue 
pressure by one party against the counterparty. Compensatory damages 
likely would be insufficient if the probability of private law enforcement is 
low. However, some level of deterrence would be necessary. Taiwan is 
one of the few jurisdictions—if not the only jurisdiction outside the United 
States—that awards treble damages for a violation of its competition laws. 
In fact, a study found that outside the United States, private antitrust suits 
virtually do not exist, and even when brought successfully, damage awards 
usually are much lower than damage awards in U.S. cases.176  
The treble damage award clearly mirrors American antitrust law. 
However, damages do not automatically triple; the award, if any, and the 
measure (up to three times the actual damages) are subject to the discretion 
of the court, which will not award treble damages automatically. The FTL 
 172. FTL art. 30. 
 173. Civil Code art. 767, translated in MAJOR LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN 
(James C. Liu et al. trans., 1991). 
 174. See Patent Law art. 88 (2001); Copyright Law art. 84 (1998); Trademark Law art. 61 (1997). 
English translations of the Patent Law, Copyright Law, and Trademark Law are available at 
http://www. saint-island.com.tw/iplaws.asp. 
 175. FTL arts. 31-32. 
 176. Joel Davidow, The Worldwide Influence of U.S. Antitrust, 35 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 603, 620 
(1990). 
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nevertheless establishes the principle of awarding punitive damages for 
wrongful conduct. However, it remains unclear how effective this punitive 
relief is. In addition to the requirement to post court fees, other “barriers” 
exist to private enforcement of competition laws, including the lack of 
civil discovery procedures and judges’ general desires to control damage 
awards. Despite the ostensible strong relief under the treble damages 
clause, no important private causes of action for a violation of the FTL 
have been reported. 
In sum, Taiwan’s experience thus far suggests that litigants do not rely 
exclusively on the adversarial approach to resolve economic issues or 
disputes. This phenomenon applies in disputes involving a conflict among 
different interest groups such as producers and consumers, and even 
among the producers themselves (such as large firms against small firms 
and manufacturers against distributors). For offensive reasons (like 
maintaining its role in unifying the interpretation of a highly technical but 
politically important economic statute like the FTL) and defensive reasons 
(such as preventing the occurrence of “wrong” enforcement positions and 
judicially-created interpretations that would stifle business), the TFTC 
decided to monopolize FTL enforcement. In the short term, FTL 
jurisprudence will grow primarily through agency decisions and 
interpretations, treatises, and scholarship, rather than through private 
litigation. 
B. Criminal Sanctions 
The FTL authorizes criminal sanctions for certain violations. 
Monopolization, illegal cartels, passing off, and illegal multilevel 
distribution arrangements could lead to a maximum prison sentence of 
three years and/or a criminal fine of up to NT$100 million (approximately 
US$320,000).177 Until the 1999 amendment, the maximum criminal fine 
available was only NT$1 million, which the TFTC rarely imposed. Since 
the 1999 amendment, the TFTC has taken a more aggressive enforcement 
attitude, as the political environment is riper and the decentralizaton of 
power makes any effort to establish a more lenient enforcement program 
more difficult. However, while the TFTC has maintained criminal 
sanctions as a deterrent, it has focused primarily on administrative 
enforcement. 
An unabated criminal violation of certain FTL provisions following a 
 177. FTL art. 35. 
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TFTC order to cease and desist is punishable by up to two years in prison 
and a criminal fine of up to NT$50 million.178 These provisions encompass 
rules against boycott conduct, discrimination, luring customers or forming 
cartels with improper inducement or coercion, misappropriation of trade 
secrets, and unreasonable vertical and other restraints. Trade libel could 
lead to a maximum of two years in prison and/or a fine of NT$50 million 
(reflecting an increase of over one hundred times the fine before the 1999 
amendment).179 
In addition to these strong criminal sanctions, Taiwan’s Code of 
Criminal Procedure adopts the German approach180 by allowing 
prosecution of a crime by the victim.181 The criminal sanctions in the FTL 
therefore provide a potentially powerful tool with which competitors and 
consumers can threaten prosecution. In contrast, in the United States, 
criminal enforcement of competition laws is the exclusive responsibility of 
the U.S. Department of Justice. Excessive deterrence, compounded by the 
vague terms in the FTL and their possible multiple interpretations, has 
become a real concern of the business community in Taiwan. The TFTC 
accordingly sponsored an amendment, enacted in 1999, that requires all 
criminal prosecutions (including public prosecutions) to follow its 
administrative enforcement actions.  
Thus far, few have witnessed the strength of the FTL’s criminal 
provisions. The TFTC has recommended criminal prosecution in only a 
few cases involving egregious illegal cartel and bid rigging conduct. In the 
foreseeable future, criminal enforcement of the FTL likely will remain 
sporadic, and the TFTC likely will continue to reserve criminal sanctions 
for blatantly egregious conduct. In this regard, perhaps Taiwan’s 
experience will mirror that of more industrialized nations.  
C. Administrative Enforcement 
On its face, the FTL places equal weight on civil, criminal, and 
administrative modes of enforcement. However, in practice, it places the 
strongest emphasis on enforcement by administrative agencies, primarily 
the TFTC. As previously mentioned, the FTL and its companion statute, 
the Organic Statute for the Fair Trade Commission, authorized the creation 
 178. FTL art. 36. 
 179. FTL art. 37. 
 180. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 101-02 (1977). 
 181. Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsing-shih Su-sung Fa [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 319 (1935) 
(amended 1990), translated in MAJOR LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN, supra note 173. 
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of the TFTC as a ministerial level agency under Taiwan’s cabinet, the 
EY.182 The TFTC is determined to dominate enforcement of the FTL, 
regardless of the substantive enforcement policies. In other words, the 
TFTC will determine whether and how to enforce the provisions of the 
FTL. 
Although the TFTC would not admit it publicly, it wields semi-judicial 
power. The TFTC also possesses the power to conduct administrative 
investigations,183 and it often holds informal hearings (by invitation only, 
except that members of the press sometimes may attend) in connection 
with such investigations. Invitees often include industry experts, 
competitors, representatives of consumer groups, other government 
agencies with jurisdiction over the target of the investigation, scholars, and 
the enterprise under investigation. The TFTC follows no trial-like 
investigative procedures; the Commissioner in charge of the investigation 
serves as the chairman and invites comments as if conducting a roundtable 
discussion. For a case of first impression requiring some expertise, the 
focus usually centers on policy issues. Invitees are all assumed to be 
experts, and usually are unrestrained, even when their comments exceed 
their field of expertise. These hearings reflect a strategy that the TFTC 
adopted early on to co-opt the media and scholars, which, in turn, help 
construct an image of accountability and legitimacy. 
This informality is extremely useful for developing a sharpened 
understanding of the issues at hand. Compared with the practice of other 
agencies, and in view of the lack of legislation governing formal 
administrative procedures, such hearings provide desirable transparency 
and project an image of political accountability. However, the strength of 
this informality also could constitute its weaknesses; the enterprise under 
investigation does not know the identity of the complainants and may feel 
that no fair opportunity exists to present a defense on the basis of legal 
principles rather than policy preferences, especially when the TFTC holds 
hearings without its presence. Media reporting by attending members of 
the press or from the leakage of other attendees could cast a cloud over the 
corporate image of the enterprise under investigation. 
The entry into force of the new ALL in July 2000 and APA in 2001, 
however, is forcing the TFTC to change its public hearing practice. As 
previously mentioned, the TFTC does not want its decisions challenged in 
an administrative appeals proceeding. If anything, the TFTC would rather 
 182. See FTL art. 25; Organic Statute for the Fair Trade Comm’n art. 1. See also supra note 39. 
 183. FTL art. 27. 
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be reversed by the Superior Administrative Court, which came into being 
under the new ALL in July 2000. The APA provision on formal public 
hearings makes bypassing the EY review a possibility. In one way, this 
will be an improvement as there will be more direct access to judicial 
review. However, the EY will lose its check on TFTC activism in some 
individual cases.  
Whether the Superior Administrative courts will provide the same 
quality control function remains to be seen. Outside the TFTC, little 
expertise on competition law exists. Therefore, the Superior 
Administrative courts, and the Supreme Administrative Court above it, 
must rely more on the adversarial system of the new ALL to remain aware 
of the difficult legal and economic issues and market practices arising 
under the FTL. However, one immediate drawback with the new ALL 
system exists. Because the Superior Administrative courts follow the civil 
litigation approach and allow oral argument, the numerous filings 
challenging agency adjudications have swamped their nineteen judges. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the first year of the new ALL system 
generated a backlog of more than twenty thousand cases. This heavy 
docket certainly will affect the quality of the judicial review of TFTC 
decisions, as many businesses will not be able to wait long for a judicial 
determination of their challenge to the TFTC’s actions. 
FTL Article 25(3) authorizes the TFTC to review the economic 
conditions and commercial activities of enterprises.184 Unfortunately, the 
vague language of Article 25(3) leaves unclear whether the TFTC 
possesses the power to compel the release of information when it engages 
in general “investigations” when no allegation of illegal conduct exists, or 
whether it merely possesses the power to conduct “surveys,” in which case 
it could not compel enterprises to furnish sensitive, proprietary 
information such as lists of their most important customers. Although this 
issue remains unsettled, the TFTC’s current inclination is to assert the 
former argument. By the mid- 1990s, the TFTC’s databank had grown 
rapidly and already contained basic information for over 10,450 
enterprises in Taiwan.185 
Every FTL violation could result in administrative fines and, in certain 
cases, structural and corrective remedies.186 Before the 1999 amendment, 
the TFTC could assess administrative fines of up to NT$1 million 
(US$40,000) for each violation. As a result, when Taiwan enacted the 
 184. FTL art. 25(3). 
 185. Chairman Wang’s Report, supra note 79, at 15. 
 
 186. FTL art. 41. 
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FTL, there was substantial apprehension that a chilling effect on economic 
activities might result from overzealous enforcement actions. Accordingly, 
the TFTC’s administrative sanctions have to follow cease-and-desist 
orders for acts of noncompliance. By the late 1990s, the decentralization 
of power and activism actually led to the TFTC’s own dissatisfaction with 
the low ceiling on the administrative fines. The TFTC then secured an 
FTL amendment allowing the TFTC to assess administrative sanctions 
immediately upon finding a violation. In other words, after 1999, the 
TFTC could assess administrative sanctions without having to fire a 
“warning shot.”  
The 1999 amendment to the FTL substantially enhanced the TFTC’s 
power to pursue administrative fines. It increased the ceiling of 
administrative sanctions against illegal mergers from NT$100,000 to 
NT$50 million. Similarly, under Article 41 of the FTL as amended, the 
TFTC could mete out administrative fines ranging from NT$50,000 to 
NT$25 million for a first substantive offense, with additional fines ranging 
from NT$100,000 to NT$50 million for continued violations.187 The 
amendment also strengthened administrative punishment for violations of 
the rules obligating enterprises to accept administrative investigations.188 
The unease of Taiwan’s local and foreign business community 
following enactment of the FTL led the TFTC to embark on a campaign to 
publicize the law. By November 30, 1993, the TFTC had held more than 
five hundred explanatory seminars and distributed more than 1.2 million 
copies of explanatory materials to the business community and the public. 
For an economy with twenty-two million people and a land mass of thirty-
six thousand kilometers (about the size of Lake Michigan), this is a 
formidable effort. The TFTC still continues to post announcements 
explaining the law and urging compliance with it on both the radio and the 
sides of public buses.189 Generally, this campaign has succeeded in 
ensuring strong public awareness of the existence of competition laws. 
As the first-term Commissioners served out the second half of their 
tenure, a trend towards more aggressive enforcement actions began. 
Generally, the TFTC has preferred taking the moral suasion approach over 
the adversarial approach. For example, the TFTC’s stated goals for the last 
 187. In addition, in accordance with Article 43, a violation of rules governing multilevel 
distributions and sales as strengthened by Articles 23-1, 23-2 and 23-3 would be subject to the same 
two-tier system of administrative fines. 
 188. See FTL art. 43. The TFTC would punish the first occurrence of noncompliance with orders 
to submit to an administrative investigation with fines ranging from NT$20,000 to NT$250,000. 
Continued noncompliance would result in fines ranging from NT$50,000 to NT$500,000. 
 189. Chairman Wang’s Report, supra note 79, at 10-11. 
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year of the first-term Commissioners’ tenure included a program to target 
certain industries for such moral suasion efforts. The targeted industries or 
business activities included banks, insurance companies, volume 
merchants and discount stores, tile companies, the automobile industry, 
tire companies, retail chains for electrical appliances, computer classes, 
and multilevel distribution practices.190 
Several reasons exist for this course of action. First, the TFTC did not 
wish to create an anti-business image after laying the foundation for its 
enforcement program, especially with the recent reduction in Taiwan’s 
economic growth. Second, firms under investigation that possess some 
market power presumably could wield political power as well. The TFTC 
has been careful not to confront powerful but often ignorant members of 
the LY, whose erratic conduct could lead to a budget freeze and disruption 
of enforcement activities. Third, when other ministries exercise primary 
jurisdiction over the substantive regulation of firms targeted by TFTC 
investigations, the FTL requires the TFTC to consult with them.191 The 
desire to maintain a collegial appearance while persisting in its position 
also could lead the TFTC to adopt the moral suasion approach.  
As Taiwan’s democratization led to the decentralization of power 
toward the end of the 1990s, proponents of the adversarial approach within 
the TFTC began to outnumber those favoring the moral suasion approach. 
The most amazing tension focused on the second half of the TFTC’s third 
term, which occurred from mid-1999 to early 2001. The amount of the 
administrative fines assessed by the TFTC represents an important gauge 
of this change in enforcement position. As of the end of April 2001, the 
TFTC had taken enforcement action and rendered sanctions against a total 
of 2,428 enterprises in a total of 1,601 cases.192 Of those enterprises, 632 
in 388 cases received administrative fines totalling NT$413 million (about 
US$14 million).193 The latter-day third term administration of the TFTC 
was the most activist, recovering a total of NT$155.56 million in 
administrative fines in 2000.194 The TFTC had assessed a total of 
NT$176.58 million in administrative fines by the end of 2001, 91% 
(NT$161.91 million) of which occurred in January 2001 before the 
outgoing TFTC commissioners stepped down! 
 190. Id. at 11. 
 191. FTL art. 9. 
 192. See Table 10, infra, at 167. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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V. CHANGING MARKET STRUCTURE THROUGH COMPETITION POLICY 
A. Fostering Competition Policy: Telecommunications Reform 
There are different approaches to fostering competition law and policy. 
The most effective and straightforward approach would resemble the ILI 
and APROC initiatives, which focus on opening up the economy as much 
as possible. Consumers benefit the most by changing the market structure 
and allowing as much freedom as possible for firms to compete. In other 
words, allowing competition policy to guide national economic 
development policy makes competition law enforcement much easier. The 
FTL, on the other hand, clearly adopts another approach. It gives the 
government, via the TFTC, a more interventionist role. Enforcement 
constitutes an ongoing and costly enterprise. The FTL regulates conduct, 
not structure. Some of its rules are even potentially anticompetitive.  
There have been sectors like SOEs or regulated industries in which the 
government either has displaced or suppressed competition. However, 
technological and market conditions have changed. Privatization and 
deregulation have led to an increased level of competition. However, 
rigorous competition law and policy are important in these newly open 
markets because an incredibly strong, often state-owned, incumbent opens 
up the market. Employees of the incumbent may be inefficient, but they 
jealously will protect their residual monopoly power or political influence 
over sympathetic politicians. The government essentially possesses a 
conflict of interest when the incumbent is state-owned. Even in the case of 
private monopolies, the smaller scale of the Taiwanese economy may 
magnify the market power of the monopolies.195 Therefore, competition 
law enforcement and faithful adherence to a strong competition policy are 
that much more important a goal. 
The FTL was designed to police competitive conduct in the 
marketplace. However, Taiwan’s telecommunications sector presented a 
vastly different situation because it did not possess a competitive market 
structure. Like its laws, Taiwan’s telecommunications industry follows the 
European model. Before the telecommunications reform in 1996, the 
Telecommunications Law (TL) contemplated the DGT as both the state-
 195. Recently, in Hong Kong, an interesting example emerged in which two telecom operators, 
Hutchison and Pacific Century Cyberworks, both were controlled by the Li Ka-shing family. The Li 
family reportedly has lobbied against the Hong Kong Legislative Council’s grant of authority to 
OFTA, the Office of the Telecommunications Authority, to regulate mergers of telecom operators. See 
Simon Pritchard, In Whose Best Interest?, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 20, 2001, at 14.  
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owned monopoly operator and regulator. Even though the DGT began to 
draft a bill to revamp the TL at the same time legislators drafted the FTL 
bill, it neither believed in competition nor foresaw the technological 
breakthrough, convergence, or global impact that increased competition 
would generate. It did, however, initiate a modest attempt to divide 
telecommunications services into Type I (basic) and Type II (enhanced or 
value added network) services. By the mid-1990s, the pressure for 
telecommunication reform was mounting. The DGT possessed a backlog 
demand for one million mobile phones, which it could not meet because of 
imposed procurement controls resulting from its status as a bureaucratic 
agency and SOE. 
Taiwan applied for accession to GATT (now the WTO) in 1990. 
Without an amendment, the TL would not permit any foreign participation 
in the telecommunications sector. Indeed, the TL would prohibit even 
domestic firms from entering the telecommunications sector, as it 
essentially provided the DGT with a statutory monopoly. The EY 
therefore submitted three bills to the LY. First, a new TL would allow 
other firms to enter the telecommunications market in Taiwan. The second 
bill proposed an amendment to the Organic Statute for the DGT to 
transform the DGT strictly into a market regulator. The third bill proposed 
to enact a Statute for Chung Hua Telecom Corporation in order to separate 
and incorporate the business arm of the DGT.196 
B. Phase One 
Intensive interagency lobbying efforts by the EY in 1995 led to the 
enactment of the three proposed bills into law in 1996. This reform 
ushered in the first phase of telecommunications reform in Taiwan, which 
truly began when the EY substantially overhauled the original bills.197 The 
business arm of the DGT (the future CHT) drafted these bills in its own 
self-interest. Consequently, the bills were highly inadequate, and even 
anticompetitive in certain sections. For example, under the old DGT 
version of the TL amendment bill, the CHT would monopolize all Type I 
telecommunications services. The CHT would open the Type II services to 
the private sector gradually and piecemeal following a rigorous public 
 196. In fact, the latter two bills were submitted after the LY rejected the first one as being 
insufficient on its merits. Legislators sympathetic to labor issues or reluctant to pursue privatization 
viewed the rejection as a good way to forestall market liberalization. 
 
 197. One of the authors of the bills was an official at the CEPD, which headed up interagency 
coordination efforts to lobby for passage of the economic reform laws. Taiwan grouped these laws and 
related actions under the APROC initiative.  
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interest review every six months. 
This example illustrates the strong labor opposition to the DGT. As a 
result, the three telecommunications reform laws enacted in early 1996 
constituted a compromise. The new TL possesses statutory authority for 
opening up the market, thus enabling future liberalization. Liberation was 
to come only gradually because the EY had to accept a five-year grace 
period from the date of CHT’s incorporation (July 1, 1996) to entertain a 
complete market opening.198 The new TL limited foreign ownership in 
Type I operators to 20%. Unfortunately, it was too late to remove the Type 
I and II classifications. Instead, all constituents reached a compromise so 
that the TL, as amended in 1996, defines a Type II business as anything 
that is not a Type I business, thereby making as much room for future 
growth of the Type II business as technological progress would make 
possible.  
Article 30 of the TL represents yet another important compromise. It 
required the maintenance of CHT as an SOE. In other words, privatizing 
CHT would require passage of a future amendment. This proved difficult, 
as the ruling KMT party already was very factionalized. Indeed, the KMT 
lost its majority in the LY in the national parliamentary election held 
shortly before the passage of the telecommunications reform laws in 1996. 
As a result, Taiwan lost the momentum to push for the privatization of 
CHT so as meet the imminent threat of competition. Article 30 of the TL, 
as enacted in 1996, also ensured the maintenance of CHT as one company, 
eliminating the possibility of splitting it into several operating, and even 
competing, companies, short of any legislative amendment. This provision 
reflects the typical herd mentality of SOEs in Taiwan. No unit will be 
privatized, so goes this company-wide collective bargaining strategy, 
unless all units are privatized.199 In sum, by forestalling privatization, the 
CHT allowed its employees to maintain civil servant status, thus ensuring 
job protection. 
Within a year of CHT’s incorporation, the new DGT completed the 
tendering process for all mobile communications in Taiwan. By early 
 198. This grace period did not appear in the new TL. Rather, policy decisions under the APROC 
initiative reflected it. This gave the EY some leeway in interpreting the grace period. Indeed, one 
interpretation would mean that tendering would not begin until the end of the five-year period. 
However, the CEPD and MOTC persuaded the EY to follow the more enlightened interpretation that 
tendering should be early enough so that effective competition can occur by the end of the five-year 
period. 
 199. This kind of strategy does not always work. In the case of Taiwan Machinery Company’s 
loss of competitiveness in all sectors, this strategy led to piecemeal privatization of each business unit. 
The government ultimately lost its going concern value for the entire business. 
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1998, private sector operators of mobile phone, paging, and mobile data 
services were up and running. Today, mobile phone penetration in Taiwan 
exceeds 90% of the telecommunications market, and CHT no longer 
possesses the largest market share. However, private sector operators 
encountered many regulatory and competitive hurdles. First, to ensure 
maximum participation, the DGT awarded national and regional licenses, 
thereby balkanizing the national market. Second, the DGT’s 
interconnection regulations proved utterly ineffective in ensuring efficient 
interconnection arrangements between the new operators and CHT. These 
interconnection regulations, for example, used historical cost rather than 
forward-looking incremental cost as the basis for interconnection. 
Worse yet, neither the TL nor the Organic Statute for the DGT 
provided effective dispute resolution mechanisms. The Organic Statute 
actually created a Dispute Resolution Committee within the DGT. 
Theoretically inspired by the Canadian Radio and Telecommunications 
Commission (CRTC) model, the members of this committee were to be 
appointed and balance off the forefront of the DGT. However, the Dispute 
Resolution Committee turned out to be a paper tiger. The most effective 
interconnection negotiations, it turns out, allowed private sector operators 
to enlist the support of their foreign shareholders (mostly American 
telecommunications companies), and through them, the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR). Therefore, consultations between the DGT 
and USTR regarding Taiwan’s WTO accession also led to reductions in 
interconnection cost. Allegations of price-based and non-price predation 
made to the TFTC were essentially ineffective. 
C. Phase Two 
The second phase of Taiwan’s telecommunications market reform 
began in early 1998, almost simultaneously with the opening of the mobile 
communications sector. For more than a year, a blue ribbon committee 
created by the DGT and entitled the Fixed Network Market Opening Task 
Force worked on developing tendering rules governing the opening of a 
fixed network market, fair competition rules for the telecommunications 
market, and technological issues. The Task Force included more than one 
hundred members representing telecommunications companies in Taiwan 
and abroad, including agencies such as the DGT and the TFTC, scholars, 
experts, and representatives of consumer groups. Although not binding on 
the DGT, the Task Force provided a forum to discuss market opening 
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issues in a way that offered transparency and accountability.200 
After a year’s work, the Task Force made a number of 
recommendations to the DGT. Most notably, the Task Force 
recommended two full licenses, two international licenses, and three local 
licenses for the imminent market opening. However, in early 1999, 
legislators enacted an amendment to the Budget Law based on a bill 
floated by two members of the LY who thoroughly studied economics. 
This new law required the government to either run auctions for licenses 
or completely open a new sector, unless another statute authorized merit 
review, which would take precedence. Uncertain whether Article 12 of the 
TL, as amended in 1996, took precedence over the new Budget Law, the 
EY announced that it would not impose a numeric quota on the number of 
fixed network licenses slated for tender at the end of 1999. At the same 
time, the MOTC and DGT adopted fixed network telecommunication 
regulations that imposed a minimum initial paid-in capital floor of NT$40 
billion (about US$1.3 billion) for each new fixed network operator. These 
regulations also permitted certain utilities (including mobile phone 
operators and cable operators) to obtain licenses to lease circuits. An 
earlier proposal granting successful applicants a four year grace period met 
resistance from the United States, as it perceived the proposal to be 
inconsistent with Taiwan’s schedule for opening its markets in accordance 
with WTO accession. 
Another controversial provision in the fixed network regulations 
involves a requirement that each potential operator build 1,000,000 
telecommunications ports, and that no such operator may begin any 
business without building at least 150,000 ports. The DGT does not 
require use of DSL, HFC, or other technologies. However, each successful 
applicant must demonstrate the existence of such ports. This requirement, 
therefore, becomes very relevant to applicants who wish to use their cable 
operator network to roll out their infrastructure. This concerns their 
competitors as well, as the time it takes to reach the market is a concern 
for all. These rules demonstrate the DGT’s dilemma. It wanted to use the 
fixed network tendering opportunity to require all successful applicants to 
construct an alternative infrastructure. At the same time, it wanted to 
provide mechanisms for robust competition among the new applicants, as 
well as between the applicants and CHT. 
 200. The Task Force operated differently from a public hearing. After the Task Force completed 
its work, the APA was enacted and ultimately came into force in 2001. Based on similar legislation in 
the United States and Germany, the APA requires public hearings and comments when agencies adopt 
important measures affecting the public.  
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In 1998, the DGT selected the middle of 1999 as its deadline for 
submitting applications for fixed network licenses. However, the DGT 
delayed this schedule until the end of 1999 because it needed more time to 
review and adopt the relevant tendering rules and regulations governing 
fixed network operators. Meanwhile, another amendment to the TL was 
submitted for LY review. Enacted in November 1999, it contained several 
important changes. First, it allowed for an increase in direct foreign 
ownership of Type I telecommunications businesses up to a maximum of 
20%. In addition, it raised the total foreign ownership limit to 60%, 
thereby allowing at least 40% indirect foreign ownership. However, due to 
legislative uncertainty, this provision finally went into force in January 
2000 under an EY decree and well after the deadline for fixed network 
tendering had passed. 
The TL, as amended in 1999, also provides for incentive price 
regulation through adjustable price caps. In addition, because of a 
loophole in the 1996 TL, the prohibition against cross-subsidization 
applied only between Type I and Type II businesses. The 1999 
amendment removed this loophole by making the prohibition applicable to 
business segments within the Type I category (such as mobile and fixed 
network businesses) as well. In addition, the 1999 amendment mandated 
accounting transparency and separation. Most importantly, the 1999 
amendment added a provision specifically prohibiting anticompetitive 
conduct.201  
The 1999 amendment to the TL also removed the barrier to CHT’s 
privatization, and specifically provides for the issuance of a golden share 
that the government would hold to safeguard public interest during and 
after the completion of privatization.202 In tandem with the 1999 
amendment and the tendering for the fixed network licenses, the DGT’s 
regulations governing fixed network operators adopted a number of fair 
competition rules, including regulation of dominant telecommunications 
operators (a presumed status if a firm holds a 25% market share). The 
regulations mandate open access for holders of leased circuits that 
constitute dominant operators, bottleneck facilities, and key infrastructure 
facilities.203 
 201. Telecommunications Law art. 26-1 (1996) (amended 1999). Interestingly, this provision was 
borrowed from Article 10 of the FTL, which applies to monopolization. However, only a prior 
determination by the DGT that a telecom operator is a dominant operator triggers this provision. On 
the other hand, the 1999 amendment repealed the comparable provision in Article 10(2) of the FTL. 
 202. Telecommunications Law art. 12. The practice of issuing a golden share, that is, a share of 
preferred stock containing certain negative controls, began with the privatization of British Telecom. 
 203. Local loop unbundling is easier said than done in Taiwan as well as in Europe. See, e.g., Fred 
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Unfortunately, the fixed network market opening received criticism. 
The final review and interview of the management team occurred on 
March 19, 2000, one day after the presidential election.204 After 
announcing the results, the DGT again amended the fixed network 
regulations to open the international submarine cable landing. This 
opening would be pro-competitive, but also would undercut the DGT’s 
alternative infrastructure policy underlying the high capitalization and 
infrastructure rollout requirements.  
D. Beyond the Telecommunications Market Opening 
All three successful bidders for the fixed network licenses stress an 
information-communications strategy. All saw convergence as an 
unavoidable trend. How to meet the convergence trends properly will 
present the biggest challenge for all operators.205 Meanwhile, 
technological convergence has made regulatory balkanization increasingly 
intolerable. 
Taiwan possesses a highly segmented communications market. During 
the martial law era, the government strictly controlled the print media 
under the Publication Law. As a result, print media became highly 
concentrated. However, since the lifting of the martial law decree and 
related moratorium on entry into the print media in the late 1980s, 
competition has intensified with any new entrants. Since the late 1980s, 
competition has intensified in the broadcast and television segment as 
well. Under the Broadcast and Television Law, the government had 
monopolized the terrestrial television market for forty years through three 
affiliated stations. In the mid-1980s, however, dissatisfaction with poor 
programming and the desire by opposing politicians to break the 
government chokehold led to the mushrooming of illegal cable stations 
known as the “fourth stations.” Authorities gradually discontinued 
unsuccessful and highly controversial enforcement attempts to crack down 
these illegal cable operators. Instead, the government began to face reality 
and enacted a Cable Television Law in 1993 to grant licenses to applicants 
who both passed the merit reviews of the regulator, the GIO, and 
Dawson, Devil of A Time: Lack of Details Could Delay European Unbundling 22-23 (May 1, 2001), 
at http://www.phoneplusinternational.com/articles/151sec3a.html (last visited May 19, 2002). 
 204. Three of the four consortia received establishment permits for the rollout. 
 205. For an excellent treatment of the relevant issues and strategies, see CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. 
VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY (1999). 
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completed the rollout requirement. Taiwan now enjoys over 70% cable 
penetration, which serves as a good foundation for an information society. 
VI. THE INTERACTION OF COMPETITION AND COMMUNICATION LAWS 
A. Embracing Competition and Agency Coordination 
As mentioned above, FTL Article 46, when enacted, required the 
TFTC to defer to other agencies when specific legislation authorizes 
industry regulation. Despite its ambiguity, the 1998 amendment to Article 
46 reflects the sentiment that competition policy should take precedence 
over industrial policy. Indeed, the APROC initiative under which the EY 
enacted three telecommunications laws reflects this policy inclination. As 
amended in 1996 and 1999, the TL now clearly demonstrates the same 
preference for competition policy. However, as the fixed network market 
opening and the tendering policy show, overcoming industrial policy is 
easier said than done.  
Why is it desirable to add another layer of competition rules to the TL 
when the FTL contains general competition rules? Foreign examples 
suggest that the two-track approach to enforce competition policy ensures 
effective competition. In the telecommunications sector, no level playing 
field exists. Therefore, authorities should implant competition rules in the 
TL to supplement FTL enforcement. The TFTC and DGT, however, need 
to increase their coordination in enforcing various competition rules in 
these two statutes. So far, their coordination has left much room for 
improvement. In the future, a coordinated two-prong enforcement by the 
agencies will be desirable. The competition rules in the TL exist to ensure 
proper industry structure and practice. Compliance with these competition 
rules should not constitute an exemption from the competition rules in the 
FTL, which establish a higher behavioral standard. 
B. Rethinking FTL Rules 
 
Applying competition rules in the communications market also requires 
some serious rethinking of the rules in the FTL. When markets and 
industries converge, defining the relevant market will become more 
difficult. In addition, as the time to reach the market becomes increasingly 
important, so do expeditious enforcement actions arising under the FTL’s 
anti-monopolization provisions. The TFTC should not allow these 
provisions to atrophy in the hope that the less stringent rules (such as the 
general prohibition of unfair methods of competition under FTL Article 
24) will do the work. 
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The cartel control provisions of the FTL need to be overhauled as soon 
as possible. Their rigidity and overbroad coverage are noticeable in the 
case of the telecommunications market, which epitomizes network 
economy. Competitors need to interconnect or otherwise cooperate 
efficiently. Application for prior TFTC approval will consume valuable 
time and directly contradict the speed requirement of the communications 
industry. 
C. Rethinking Industry Regulation 
Legislation governing Taiwan’s communications industry merits some 
serious rethinking as well. Taiwan adopted the Broadcast and Television 
Law, TL, and Cable Television Law at different stages of its economic and 
political development. The technologies that formed their legislative 
assumptions have undergone tremendous improvements. Maintaining 
regulatory balkanization will provide a disservice. For example, these 
statutes contain different rules governing foreign ownership limitations. 
Some statutes, such as the Cable Television Law, contain rigid ownership 
diversification requirements that make investment planning more difficult. 
D. Enhancing Independence 
In 1998, the EY adopted a preliminary proposal to create a new 
commission patterned after the U.S. Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC).206 This new commission will take over the functions of the 
Broadcast and Television Department of the GIO and DGT. The proposal 
contemplates an organizational structure very similar to the TFTC and 
FCC.  
Whether this FCC model would work in Taiwan depends on a number 
of institutional and political factors. Clearly, the DGT, as an agency under 
the MOTC, does not possess sufficient institutional stature. In addition, the 
political and bureaucratic culture of an industry dominated by SOEs 
makes industry regulation difficult. The new commission, like the TFTC, 
would be a ministry-level agency directly under the EY. This would give it 
heightened stature and, subsequently, teeth. However, the more important 
task is to ensure that the new commission will perform the same functions 
as the FCC. 
 206. This is ironic, as there have been proposals to do away with the FCC now that the Federal 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 mandates full competition. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LAW AND 
DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM (1997). 
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Indeed, the TFTC faces the same issue. Taiwan created the TFTC 
partially in the image of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. The TFTC 
has had almost a decade to increase its stature, independence, and 
expertise. However, it has yet to behave like the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission because political institutions and the culture in Taiwan are 
quite different. Any architect for a new commission to regulate Taiwan’s 
communications sector should keep the TFTC’s path in mind. On the other 
hand, one need not be unduly alarmed or discouraged: a lull existed as 
well in antitrust enforcement in the United States immediately following 
passage of the Sherman Act. In addition, in Chinese legal culture, the 
passage of a law only means the beginning of a government measure or 
program. Enforcement always comes much later.  
In late 2001, a DGT-commissioned study by the author reaffirmed the 
1998 EY proposal to set up an independent regulatory commission to be 
named the National Communications Commission (NCC). To follow 
convergence trends, the NCC would combine the regulatory functions of 
the DGT and GIO. However, in early 2002, the DPP government adopted 
a government-reengineering plan, whose main goal was to reduce the 
number of agencies. The plan calls for placing the NCC under a new 
Ministry of Science and Technology, thereby taking a surprising turn on 
Taiwan’s now apparent long-awaited and still uncertain path to achieve 
regulatory independence! 
E. Avoidance of the Government’s Conflict of Interest 
Lax law enforcement against SOEs is largely a reflection of the 
inherent conflict of government interests. Taiwan’s telecommunications 
sector is only one such example. The FTL does not authorize structural 
remedies like divestiture. To level the playing field, CHT should be 
privatized. This is not to say that privatization necessarily will improve 
competition law compliance at CHT. However, it will remove the conflicts 
of interest that have prevented the government from faithfully enforcing its 
laws against SOEs. Privatization efforts also will enhance CHT’s 
competitiveness. However, from a competition law perspective, avoidance 
of the government’s conflict of interests requires that the government’s 
residual interest in SOEs remains minimal.207 This is unlikely to occur 
 207. Under Taiwan’s Privatization Law, an SOE is “privatized” once government ownership falls 
below 50%. However, drawing a distinction at 50% is unrealistic because less ownership still could 
constitute working control. In addition, personnel and procurement controls still could come at the 
ministry level, so long as it still is able to control a substantial interest in the “privatized” companies. 
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with CHT in the near future.  
In Taiwan, privatization of SOEs often is difficult because of labor 
opposition. The CHT labor union has argued, for example, that labor 
representatives should sit on CHT’s board of directors, following the 
German codetermination (Mitbestimmung) model. Indeed, the DPP’s party 
platform calls for such labor codetermination. Since it came to power in 
May 2000, the DPP government has shown some hesitation in pursuing 
privatization in general.208 CHT’s unrealistically ambitious privatization 
plan already has experienced significant delays. 
In hindsight, telecommunication regulation probably was unnecessary. 
The European model that Taiwan adopted has made it difficult to level the 
playing field. Taiwan possesses a short history of competition policy. The 
FTL’s first decade will lay a good foundation for the enforcement of 
competition law. However, tremendous work is needed to make 
enforcement more effective and less rigid. 
Thus far, the FTL, as a set of competition rules, has been more 
concerned with conduct. On the other hand, the TL and related regulations 
are more concerned with changing the industry structure. Competition law 
and communications law will become more compatible over time. 
Convergence also will force an overhaul of inconsistent, industry-specific 
legislation such as the TL, Cable Television Law, and Broadcast and 
Television Law. 
Enforcement of competition rules in both the FTL and TL requires 
further improvement. A whole host of issues still face the TFTC and 
whatever new commission the legislature may establish with the aspiration 
of fulfilling a FCC function. However, two indicators suggest that one 
should be cautiously optimistic. First, Taiwan has embarked on a steady 
course of democratization. With political parties transferring power at the 
wishes of the people, competition law enforcement will become more 
apolitical and professionalized. Second, Taiwan’s entry into the WTO will 
ensure a continued liberalization of all sectors of the domestic economy, 
including communications. Over time, competition law enforcement in the 
communications sector will become more robust. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Taiwan’s first decade of enforcing the FTL offers an interesting and 
important example of fostering competition law and policy. One can draw 
 208. Since 1990, Taiwan has seen less than half a dozen “privatization” projects. 
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several observations from this experience, and they may be useful, from a 
comparative perspective, to similarly situated economies. 
First, as this Article clearly demonstrates, competition law and policy 
comprise a part of any jurisdiction’s political economy. In Taiwan’s case, 
the political economy took the form of traditional Chinese political views 
on monopolies and primitive rules against monopolization and illegal 
cartels. Political economy also informed the drafting and passage of the 
FTL, as well as the composition of the TFTC and its work. 
Second, there should be a proper division of labor between competition 
law and competition policy. A vigorous competition policy will open the 
market, which makes competition law enforcement much easier and more 
sensible. 
Third, calling competition law a “fair trade” law is dangerous. 
Legislative goals are laudably stated and elegantly pluralistic, but they 
cloud the real purpose of competition law, which is to foster consumer 
welfare. By labeling conduct in fairness terms, the FTL often ignores 
allocative efficiency. Certain FTL provisions and enforcement positions of 
the TFTC are clearly anticompetitive. 
Fourth, from the perspective of public choice, the TFTC maximizes its 
own position. When activism was politically unacceptable, the TFTC 
started modestly, with a stronger focus on publicity and outreach than 
actual enforcement. The TFTC also developed a sophisticated practice of 
administrative guidance and moral suasion. However, when political 
power became more decentralized in Taiwan, the TFTC became more 
pluralistic and activist. Currently, the TFTC’s infatuation with 
monopolizing FTL enforcement is more expedient than beneficial. 
Fifth, certain provisions of the FTL, including those that concern cartel 
regulation and merger control, must be examined closely to ensure that 
they truly meet Taiwan’s need to succeed in a global economy.  
Sixth, the TFTC has demonstrated significant interest in the high-tech 
sector, which happens to involve the conflict of interest of strong foreign 
and domestic companies. The TFTC needs to reexamine certain 
enforcement positions and decisions, including the guidelines governing 
the issuance of warning letters by owners of intellectual property rights 
and the CD-R case. The TFTC must neither appear to favor domestic 
enterprises that possess licenses nor intervene in the terms of such 
licensing programs when its intervention is not based on well-reasoned 
antitrust economics. 
Seventh, procedural rules are just as important as substantive rules. 
Even though Taiwan’s FTL provides for extraordinary remedies like treble 
damages, judicial enforcement of the FTL remains weak. The more the 
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FTL parallels agency law, the more regulatory and burdensome it can be. 
Eighth, Taiwan’s experience shows that the government often bears 
responsibility for creating an anticompetitive market environment. It has 
done so in the usual ways: state ownership, heavy regulation of particular 
industries, cross-subsidies, and protectionism. The FTL embodies a 
different philosophy; competition policy is more than industrial policy or 
industry protection. However, fostering competition law and policy is 
easier said than done. The TFTC had to maneuver carefully in its first 
decade to fashion an effective enforcement policy that matched the 
transition of the industrial policy of Taiwan. Indeed, the TFTC even had to 
make some Faustian deals in order to protect its enforcement program. 
Ninth, despite all the deficiencies of the TFTC and the FTL, Taiwan’s 
first decade of competition law enforcement and fostering competition 
policy has produced admirable results. Now that the TFTC has established 
itself, it should develop a program in the next ten years to develop true 
professionalism and antitrust expertise. This would involve serious self-
scrutiny by the TFTC to amend the FTL and adjust the enforcement 
program so that Taiwan can use its enforcement resources in the best 
possible ways. 
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APPENDIX: TFTC STATISTICS 
Table 1: TFTC Case Load 
Number of Cases 
Year Total 
Complaints 
Applications for 
Exemptions on 
Concerted Actions 
Applications for 
Approvals on 
Combination 
Requests for 
Explanation 
1992 1,296 1,039 12 13 232 
1993 1,567 1,243 9 112 203 
1994 2,020 1,499 11 262 248 
1995 2,486 1,768 2 435 281 
1996 2,234 1,636 12 334 252 
1997 2,277 1,480 23 561 213 
1998 2,444 1,335 13 863 233 
1999 2,757 1,522 7 1,064 164 
2000 2,697 1,369 12 1,187 129 
04/30/2001 919 478 3 405 33 
Total 19,779 12,891 101 4,831 1,956 
 
 
  Table 2: Results of Complaints Filed with the TFTC 
 Total Filings 
Sanctioned 
by TFTC 
No Action 
Taken 
Administrative 
Handling209 
Investigation 
Suspended210 
Consolidated into 
Other Cases 
Total 12,843 1,403 2,490 271 7,695 984 
1992 757 51 100 - 591 15 
1993 1,094 78 200 7 749 60 
1994 1,408 118 306 40 852 92 
1995 1,643 157 281 75 997 133 
1996 1,633 172 331 62 931 137 
1997 1,662 198 323 34 912 195 
1998 1,409 218 285 23 773 110 
1999 1,453 151 284 17 912 89 
2000 1,384 199 304 13 759 109 
04/30/2001 400 61 76 - 219 44 
 
 
 
  Source: Statistical Office, Taiwan Fair Trade Commission. All statistics are as of April 30, 
2001, unless otherwise indicated. 
 209. Administrative handling means the TFTC has taken action to coordinate with the primary 
regulators of the respondents to seek a resolution of the dispute. Usually the TFTC will take no formal 
action. In other words, this is the TFTC’s practice of administrative guidance or “moral suasion.” 
 210. Suspended cases usually are terminated. 
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Table 3: Statistics of the Outcome of Application Cases 
Concerted Actions Combination Actions 
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Total 100 67 10 9 14 5,201 5,128 3 48 22 
1992 9 5 3 - 1 8 6 - 2 - 
1993 9 7 1 - 1 113 107 - 4 2 
1994 13 9 3 1 - 259 259 - - - 
1995 1 - - 1 - 429 426 - - 3 
1996 8 5 - - 3 340 339 - 1 - 
1997 18 11 - 1 6 537 535 - 1 1 
1998 22 18 - 4 - 855 843 - 9 3 
1999 8 4 2 - 2 1,045 1,032 - 9 4 
2000 9 6 1 2 - 1,206 1,177 3 18 8 
04/30/ 2001 3 2 - - 1 409 404 - 4 1 
 
 
Table 4: TFTC Reactions to Requests for Interpretation 
 Total Requests Replied Interpretations Termination Consolidation into Other Cases 
Total 1,977 1,332 596 49 
1992 173 133 39 1 
1993 220 164 53 3 
1994 251 180 59 12 
1995 279 157 109 13 
1996 246 175 60 11 
1997 238 148 86 4 
1998 235 156 76 3 
1999 169 108 60 1 
2000 129 89 39 1 
04/30/2001 37 22 15 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/7
p 77 Liu book pages .doc  10/14/02   4:25 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] FOSTERING COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 163 
 
 
 
Table 5: TFTC Sanctions by Type of FTL Violation211 
Restrictive Practices Unfair Competition 
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Total 1,601 201 3 19 76 25 78 1,263 19 
1992 63 22 - - 4 10 8 44 1 
1993 90 11 - 1 - 3 7 68 - 
1994 156 7 - 1 2 1 3 138 - 
1995 177 26 - - 5 2 19 136 3 
1996 197 23 - 4 5 4 10 165 1 
1997 222 21 - 2 10 2 7 181 2 
1998 245 17 - - 8 2 7 192 7 
1999 166 26 - 8 11 - 7 129 - 
2000 223 34 2 2 21 1 8 169 5 
04/30/2001 62 14 1 1 10 - 2 41 - 
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Total 743 10 491 141 65 56 9 
1992 42 - 1 4 - - - 
1993 55 - 13 11 5 3 2 
1994 82 3 53 14 8 8 - 
1995 92 1 40 15 7 6 1 
1996 104 1 59 5 8 8 - 
1997 108 2 69 18 10 8 2 
1998 101 1 83 27 21 18 3 
1999 69 1 59 16 3 3 - 
2000 77 1 86 24 1 1 - 
04/30/2001 13 - 28 7 2 1 1 
 
 
 211. As some cases involved two or more violations, the total numbers of cases punished and 
illegal practices do not correspond. The statistics do not include 41 sanctions that since have been 
cancelled. 
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Table 6: Companies Involved in Multilevel Distribution Schemes 
 
Filings as of End 
of Last Year or 
Last Month 
Filings in Current 
Month or Year 
Cancellations of 
Filings during Current 
Month or Year 
Total Filings as of 
End of Current 
Month or Year 
1992 - 243 17 226 
1993 226 165 39 352 
1994 352 188 109 431 
1995 431 282 109 604 
1996 604 300 146 758 
1997 758 304 218 844 
1998 844 240 343 741 
1999 741 184 281 644 
2000 644 160 160 644 
04/30/2001 2,612 57 35 2,634 
 
 
Table 7: Multilevel Distribution Schemes by  
Enterprises and Administrative Districts 
(as of 04/30/2001) 
 
District Number of Enterprises District 
Number of 
Enterprises 
Taiwan District 665 Chiayi County 1 
Taipei City 265 Tainan County 19 
Kaoshiung City 77 Kaoshiung County 6 
Taiwan province 323 Pingtung County 3 
Taipei County 74 Taitung County - 
Ilan County 3 Hualien County 3 
Taoyuan County 47 Penghu County - 
Hsinchu County 2 Keelung City 3 
Miaoli County 2 Hsinchu City 6 
Taichung County 10 Taichung City 116 
Changhua County 4 Chiayi City 6 
Nantou County 2 Tainon City 11 
Yunlin County 5 
 
Other areas 1 
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Table 8: Combination Cases212 
Type of Approvals  
(Article 6, Para. 1)  
Total 
Number of 
Approvals Para. 1 Para. 2 Para. 3 Para. 4 Para. 5 
1992 6 3 1 2 - - 
1993 107 3 9 1 - 94 
1994 259 5 10 4 - 240 
1995 426 4 12 2 1 408 
1996 339 3 14 3 6 314 
1997 535 5 11 10 5 506 
1998 843 3 23 16 15 791 
1999 1,032 6 14 14 - 998 
2000 1,177 25 16 59 2 1,079 
04/30/2001 401 5 5 14 1 375 
 
 
 212. Because a combination application may fall into more than one category, the actual cases are 
lower than the total shown. A Para. 1 combination refers to a statutory merger. A Para. 2 combination 
refers to the acquisition of one-third of the shares of a target company. A Para. 3 combination refers to 
a transfer of assets or operations by lease or sale. A Para. 4 combination refers to a joint operation or 
contract for operations by another enterprise. A Para. 5 combination referst to a transaction leading to 
the control of the personnel, finances, or business of another enterprise. 
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Table 9: Approvals for Actions Remaining 
Effective (as of 04/30/2001) 
 
 Subject Matter for Approvals Effective Period 
Number of 
Participating 
Enterprises 
FTL 
Authority 
1. 
Approvals for Extensions of 
Permitted Production of 69kv to 
161kv Connectors through Joint 
Ventures 
03/11/99 – 02/14/02 10 Article 14(2)
2. Joint Purchase, Import, and Shipping of Soybeans and Corn 09/01/99 – 08/31/02 53 Article 14(5)
3. Joint Purchase, Import, and Shipping of Wheat 01/01/00 – 12/31/02 9 Article 14(5)
4. Approvals for Extensions of Joint Import and Shipping of Corn 03/01/00 – 02/28/03 35 Article 14(5)
5. Joint Purchase, Import, and Shipping of Soybeans 08/30/00 – 08/31/03 11 Article 14(5)
6. Joint Purchase, Import, and Shipping of Wheat 10/01/00 – 09/30/03 4 Article 14(5)
7. Joint Purchase, Import, and Shipping of Wheat 10/01/00 – 09/30/03 41 Article 14(5)
8. Applied Postponements of Import Shipping of Soybeans 12.12.00 ~ 12.31.03 4 Article15 
9. ATM IC Card Joint Services by Financial Institutions 12/13/00 – 12/31/03 41 Article 14(1)
10. 
Joint Ventures for Research, 
Development, Design, and 
Manufacture of Electric Motor 
Vehicles 
12/29/00 – 12/31/03 11 Article 14(2); Article 15 
11. 
Joint Sandstone Quarry 
Operations for District 3A of Hua 
Lien Creek 
Three years from date of 
issuance of quarry permit 6 Article 14(2)
12. 
Joint Sandstone Quarry 
Operations for District 1A of Hua 
Lien Creek 
Three years from date of 
issuance of quarry permit 10 Article 14(2)
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Table 10: TFTC Administrative Sanctions213 
Sanctioned Cases Assessment of Administrative Fines 
 No. of 
Cases 
No. of 
Enterprises No. of Cases
No. of 
Enterprises 
Fines 
(in NT$ millions) 
Total 1,601 2,428 388 632 413,080 
1992 63 75 4 5 1,700 
1993 90 100 17 19 4,050 
1994 156 218 23 24 5,000 
1995 177 283 22 22 6,950 
1996 197 217 17 17 5,850 
1997 222 267 27 29 7,650 
1998 245 282 48 48 1,220 
1999 166 267 52 76 48,520 
2000 223 560 140 279 155,560 
04/30/ 2001 62 159 38 113 176,580 
 
 
Table 11: TFTC-Initiated Investigations214 
Cases Established Cases Concluded 
 
Total Division 1 
Division 
2 
Division 
3 Total 
Division 
1 
Division 
2 
Division 
3 
Total 266 62 59 145 254 61 56 137 
1992 10 4 1 5 4 2 1 1 
1993 28 14 7 7 18 8 3 7 
1994 40 10 10 20 37 13 6 18 
1995 35 9 9 17 36 9 8 19 
1996 21 8 4 9 27 9 9 9 
1997 26 4 5 17 31 7 8 16 
1998 38 5 6 27 34 5 2 27 
1999 29 3 12 14 27 3 12 12 
2000 37 5 4 28 37 3 6 28 
04/30/2001 2 - 1 1 3 2 1 - 
 
 
 213. The number of cases and enterprises and amount of fines do not include those sanctions that 
since have been cancelled. 
 214. Division 1 of the TFTC regulates the service and farm sectors in Taiwan. Division 2 
regulates the manufacturing sectors in Taiwan. Division 3 is in charge of enforcement against unfair 
competition. 
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Table 12: The Input of Enforcement Resources 
  for TFTC-Initiated Investigations 
Input of Enforcement Resources 
 Cases Concluded Manpower Number of Hearings or Public Panel Discussions  
Number of Firms 
Investigated 
1992-3/ 2001 254 1,830 125 1,944 
Division 1 61 449 61 554 
Division 2 56 473 45 1,033 
Division 3 137 908 19 357 
Jan - March 2001 
Cases concluded 
– status of the input of 
resources 
3 26 1 12 
Division 1 2 16 - 11 
Division 2 1 10 1 1 
Division 3 - - - - 
  
 
Table 13: Results of TFTC-Initiated Investigations 
 Sanctions 
 Total Cases Sanctioned 
Enterprises 
Sanctioned 
No Action 
Taken 
 
Administrative 
Handling 
Cases 
Suspended
 
Others
As of the end 
of 2000 149 200 282 32 29 38 3 
Division 1 26 45 60 8 14 11 - 
Division 2 28 38 100 14 10 2 1 
Division 3 95 117 122 10 5 25 2 
Jan. – Mar. 
2001 1 1 4 1 1 - - 
Division 1 1 1 4 1 - - - 
Division 2 - - - - 1 - - 
Division 3 - - - - - - - 
03/31/ 2001 150 201 286 33 30 38 3 
Division 1 27 46 64 9 14 11 - 
Division 2 28 38 100 14 11 2 1 
Division 3 95 117 122 10 5 25 2 
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Table 14: Types of TFTC-Initiated Investigations 
Article 19  Sanctioned Cases 
Article 
11 
Article 
14 
Article 
18 Total 19(1) 19(2) 19(4) 19(6)
Article 
20(1) 
Total 201 6 19 8 14 1 1 4 8 1 
1992 12 - 1 8 4 - - - 4 - 
1993 12 1 - - 3 - - - 3 - 
1994 38 1 - - - - - - - - 
1995 20 - - - - - - - - 1 
1996 25 3 2 - 3 1 1 1 - - 
1997 26 1 5 - 3 - - 3 - - 
1998 28 - - - - - - - - - 
1999 15 - 4 - - - - - - - 
2000 24 - 6 - 1 - - - 1 - 
03/31/ 2001 1 - 1 - -   - - - 
 
 
 Article 21 
Article 23 
(before 
amendment) 
Article 
43 
 Total Item 1 
Item 
2 
Item 
3 Total 
Item 
1 
Item 
2 
Article  
23-4 
(amended)
Article 
24 
Article 
41 
 
Total 34 32 2 2 67 14 55 9 28 29 1 
1992 3 3 1 - 1 - 1 - - - - 
1993 1 1 1 - 4 - 4 - - 3 - 
1994 11 11 - - 7 1 7 - 11 8 - 
1995 4 4 - - 11 6 11 - 1 3 - 
1996 9 9 - - 3 1 3 - 1 4 - 
1997 3 3 - - 10 6 7 - 2 2 - 
1998 1 1 - - 14 - 14 - 4 9 1 
1999 - - - - 6 - 6 - 5 - - 
2000 2 - - 2 11 - 2 9 4 - - 
03/31/ 2001 - - - - - - - - - - - 
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